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ABSTRACT 
  This Article examines the intersection of patent law and academic 
science. It advances two novel claims about the internalization of 
academic science within the patent system and the concomitant 
evolution of “academic exceptionalism.” Historically, relations 
between patent law and the university were characterized by mutual 
exclusion, based in part on perceived normative conflicts between 
academic culture and exclusive rights. These normative distinctions 
helped inform academic exceptionalism—the notion that the patent 
system should exclude the fruits of academic science or treat academic 
entities differently than other actors—in patent doctrine. As 
universities began to embrace patents and the nature of scientific 
research evolved, however, academic science has become internalized 
within the traditional commercial narrative of patent protection. 
Nowadays, courts frequently invoke universities’ commercial nature 
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to reject exceptional treatment for academic institutions. The twin 
trends of internalization and exceptionalism have evolved again in 
recent legislative patent reform. On the one hand, the interests of 
academic science have become completely internalized within the 
patent system to the extent that they inform general rules of 
patentability applying to all inventions. On the other hand, academic 
exceptionalism (which courts have rejected as a doctrinal matter) has 
been resurrected in the form of special statutory carve-outs for 
universities. Turning from the descriptive to the normative, this 
Article concludes with recommendations for improving the patent 
system’s regulation of academic science in multiple contexts. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 3 
I.  The Traditional Equilibrium: Separation and Exceptionalism ......... 7 
A. Academic Science Viewing Patent Law: 
Noncommercial Norms and Forbearance .............................. 8 
1. The Applied Nature of U.S. Universities ............................. 8 
2. Antipatenting Norms ........................................................... 10 
3. University Patenting Policies .............................................. 13 
4. University Patenting Practices ............................................ 14 
5. The Institutional Structure of University Patenting 
and Licensing ..................................................................... 18 
B. Patent Law Viewing Academic Science: Separation 
and Exceptionalism ................................................................. 20 
1. Patentable Subject Matter ................................................... 20 
2. Utility .................................................................................... 23 
3. The Common Law Experimental Use Exception ............. 25 
4. Remedies ............................................................................... 26 
II.  Transition: Patents Enter the Academy ........................................... 28 
III.  The Contemporary Landscape: Academic Internalization 
and the Demise of Exceptionalism ............................................... 35 
A. Academic Science Viewing Patent Law: Increased 
Patenting and Attendant Cultural Shifts .............................. 36 
1. Evolving Norms and Universities’ Embrace of 
Patenting ............................................................................. 36 
2. Changes in Patent Policy .................................................... 38 
3. Contemporary Patenting Practices ..................................... 39 
4. Shifts in Institutional Structure ........................................... 47 
B. Patent Law Viewing Academic Science: Doctrinal 
Internalization and the Demise of Exceptionalism ............. 49 
LEE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:47 PM 
2013] PATENTS AND THE UNIVERSITY 3 
1. Eroding Doctrinal Hedges .................................................. 49 
2. Rejecting Academic Exceptionalism .................................. 51 
3. The Integration of Universities Within Patent 
Doctrine .............................................................................. 61 
IV.  Statutory Internalization and the Revival of Academic 
Exceptionalism ............................................................................... 63 
A. The Bayh-Dole Act ................................................................. 64 
B. The CREATE Act .................................................................. 65 
C. The America Invents Act ....................................................... 67 
1. First-Inventor-To-File-or-Disclose ..................................... 68 
2. The Prior User Rights Defense ........................................... 71 
3. Micro Entity Status .............................................................. 74 
V.  Analysis, Assessments, and Prescriptions ........................................ 75 
A. The Mutual Internalization of Academic Science and 
Patent Law and the Evolution of Academic 
Exceptionalism ........................................................................ 75 
B. Assessments and Prescriptions .............................................. 78 
1. Patentability .......................................................................... 79 
2. Remedies ............................................................................... 83 
3. Decisions to Obtain and License Patents .......................... 83 
4. Universities as Infringers ..................................................... 85 
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 86 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2012, Carnegie Mellon University won a $1.17 
billion jury verdict in a patent infringement suit against Marvell 
Technology Group.1 If the verdict withstands post-trial motions and 
appeals, it will be the largest award in the history of U.S. patent 
litigation.2 The case is notable not only because of the enormous 
stakes involved, but also because of the identity and behavior of the 
patentee—a university. Carnegie Mellon has been accused of being a 
“patent troll,” an entity that amasses patents, does not manufacture 
any products, and exploits exclusive rights to extract rents from 
 
 1. Rich Lord, Carnegie Mellon Wins $1.17 Billion in Patent Case, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 27, 2012, at B1. The suit involved patented hard-disk technology. Id. 
 2. Joe Mullin, University Wins Record $1.17 Billion Verdict Against Marvell 
Semiconductor, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 26, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2012/12/jury-slams-marvell-with-mammoth-1-17-billion-patent-verdict. 
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innovative parties.3 In a broader sense, Carnegie Mellon’s suit 
illustrates a remarkable transformation in universities’ relationship 
with the patent system since the humble origins of academic patenting 
about a century ago. 
The question of how universities should fit into the patent system 
is an important one, for universities possess enormous innovative 
potential. In 2010, universities spent $61.2 billion on research and 
development, with federal funds accounting for 61 percent of this 
total.4 Academic research has produced thousands of important 
inventions, from medicines to search engines.5 In fiscal year 2011, 
universities received 4,700 U.S. patents, executed 4,899 licenses, and 
received over $2.5 billion in patent-related income.6 Though 
impressive to some, such statistics also raise concerns over the 
commercialization of universities and the subordination of academic 
values to financial imperatives. Indeed, the unique norms, incentives, 
and missions of universities suggest that academic inventions fit 
uncomfortably in a patent system predicated on exclusive rights and 
profit maximization. Such considerations give rise to significant policy 
questions regarding how universities should interact with the patent 
system to advance academic, technological, and economic objectives. 
To address this question, this Article examines the coevolution 
of patent law and the university. First, integrating historical analysis 
with recent doctrinal and statutory reforms, it advances a novel 
descriptive theory regarding the “internalization” of academic science 
within patent law. Although patents’ permeation of university culture 
 
 3. Mike Masnick, Patent Trolling Carnegie Mellon Wins What Could Be Largest Patent 
Verdict Ever: $1.2 Billion, TECHDIRT (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:55 AM), http://www.techdirt.
com/articles/20121226/17582221493/patent-trolling-carnegie-mellon-wins-what-could-be-largest-
patent-verdict-ever-12-billion.shtml. 
 4. Almanac of Higher Education: University Research-and-Development Spending 
Financed by the Federal Government, FY 2010, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (2012), 
https://chronicle.com/article/University/133233.  
 5. Examples include Bufferin, computer-aided design, diagnostic tests for cancer and 
osteoporosis, Gatorade, Lycos, music synthesizers, stannous fluoride, Taxol (an anticancer 
drug), and the “gene splicing” technique that produced the biotechnology industry. John Fraser, 
Communicating the Full Value of Academic Technology Transfer: Some Lessons Learned, 1 
TOMORROW’S TECH. TRANSFER 9, 10 (2009); Donald S. Siegel, David A. Waldman, Leanne E. 
Atwater & Albert N. Link, Toward a Model of the Effective Transfer of Scientific Knowledge 
from Academicians to Practitioners: Qualitative Evidence from the Commercialization of 
University Technologies, 21 J. ENGINEERING & TECH. MGMT. 115, 118 (2004).  
 6. ASSOC. OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS 
FY2011, at 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FY_2011_
Licensing_Activity_Survey&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8731. 
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has attracted significant attention,7 this Article explores the 
underappreciated, reciprocal trend of academic science’s permeation 
into the core of patent law. Historically, relations between patent law 
and the university were characterized by mutual exclusion, based in 
part on perceived normative conflicts between academic culture and 
exclusive rights. However, as universities began to embrace patents in 
the late twentieth century, academic science became similarly 
internalized within the patent system. These days, the content, norms, 
and practices of academic science—a formerly peripheral concern for 
the patent system—are frequent subjects of patent litigation and 
doctrine. Contemporary patent courts, responding to institutional 
changes, view universities as fully integrated into the commercial 
narrative of patents. More recently, academic science has been 
internalized not only in patent doctrine, but also in statute. Due to 
legislative reforms and the influence of the university lobby, the 
institutional interests of academic science are now hardwired in the 
patent statute. Patent law regulates a significant portion of academic 
activity, and universities are wielding their political influence to 
regulate patent law. 
Second and relatedly, this Article argues that throughout this 
process of mutual internalization, “academic exceptionalism” has 
evolved considerably. Academic exceptionalism stands for the 
proposition that the patent system should exclude the fruits of 
academic science or treat academic entities differently than other 
innovative actors. It arises in part from perceived normative and 
behavioral distinctions between universities and commercial, profit-
maximizing entities. Throughout most of the history of the patent 
system, prudential interests in keeping foundational discoveries in the 
public domain as well as judicial recognition of the noncommercial 
nature of university science helped contribute to academic 
exceptionalism in patent doctrine. More recently, however, courts 
have rejected such exceptionalism as patentable subject matter has 
expanded, academic science has become more aggressive, and 
universities have begun behaving more like typical commercial 
entities. Turning from doctrine to statute, academic exceptionalism 
has recently evolved again in the legislative context. On the one hand, 
 
 7. See generally, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive 
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Robert P. Merges, Property 
Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Summer 
1996, at 145; Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999). 
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exceptionalism has vanished to the extent that academic interests now 
inform general rules of patentability that apply to all inventions. On 
the other hand, academic exceptionalism has seen a resurgence in 
special legislative carve-outs that specifically benefit universities. 
Third, turning from the descriptive to the normative, this Article 
assesses these developments and offers prescriptions for enhancing 
the patent system’s regulation of academic science. This inquiry is a 
complicated one, for universities interact with the patent system in 
multiple ways, and the patent system is far from monolithic; it 
encompasses a wide range of regulatory mechanisms exerting both 
hard and soft power over entities falling within its domain. This 
Article explores the tensions that arise between the twin trends of 
academic internalization and exceptionalism. It observes that 
academic exceptionalism is neither categorically desirable nor 
undesirable but is warranted in certain contexts when treating 
universities differently than other innovative entities advances 
broader policy objectives related to promoting research and access to 
technology. Offering several prescriptions, this Article argues against 
academic exceptionalism in the general rules of patentability. 
However, it argues in favor of exercising equitable discretion to 
enhance access to patented university inventions in some instances 
and for targeted, soft regulation of university patenting and licensing 
decisions by federal funding agencies. Finally, it endorses a robust 
research exception for scientific inquiry in the infringement context. 
Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge several 
distinctions. First, in addressing university science, it is important to 
distinguish individual academic scientists from the universities that 
employ them. In some cases, the norms, motivations, and interests of 
individual scientists can differ from those of the institutions where 
they work, as illustrated in recent high-profile disputes over the 
ownership of academic inventions.8 Second, universities display great 
internal and external heterogeneity. Among universities, attitudes 
toward patenting may differ between public versus private, secular 
versus religious, and land-grant versus non-land-grant institutions. 
Within a single university, high-level leadership, technology transfer 
administrators, and faculty scientists may all view patents differently. 
Although this Article acknowledges these distinctions, they should 
 
 8. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 
131 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (2011) (holding that title to an invention initially vested in a Stanford 
University scientist rather than in Stanford University). 
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not obscure the commonalities that bind these constituencies 
together.9 University-based, academic research is a discrete and 
powerful domain of innovation that interacts with patent law in 
unique and significant ways, a phenomenon that this Article explores 
in detail. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I explores the historical 
separation of academic science and patent law, manifested both in 
noncommercial university norms and academic exceptionalism in 
patent doctrine. Part II explores a historical shift culminating in the 
late twentieth century, when the Bayh-Dole Act10 and other statutory, 
legal, and scientific developments led patents to move to the core of 
academic science. Part III considers the contemporary period in 
which patents have significantly permeated the culture of university 
science. It explores the less appreciated ways in which patent doctrine 
has internalized academic science and rejected academic 
exceptionalism based in part on increasingly commercial norms on 
the part of universities. Part IV examines the culmination of 
academia’s internalization within the patent system in legislative 
patent reform, most notably the America Invents Act.11 It also 
describes how academic exceptionalism, which courts have rejected in 
doctrine, has been resurrected in statute. Part V turns from the 
descriptive to the normative, proposing enhancements to the patent 
system’s regulation of various aspects of academic research and 
patenting. 
I.  THE TRADITIONAL EQUILIBRIUM: SEPARATION AND 
EXCEPTIONALISM 
The first phase of academic science’s interactions with patent law 
was largely characterized by mutual exclusion. Although U.S. 
universities have long served practical needs, academic norms often 
discouraged patenting. Furthermore, when universities first entered 
the patent system, they did so to advance uniquely noncommercial 
values. In reciprocal fashion, courts viewed academic science as 
falling outside of the scope of patentability and afforded universities a 
 
 9. See Rai, supra note 7, at 92 (“Basic scientific research norms share many similarities 
with the norms of academic institutions generally.”). 
 10. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)). 
 11. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be 
codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.). 
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rather privileged normative status within the patent system, thus 
reflecting academic exceptionalism. 
A. Academic Science Viewing Patent Law: Noncommercial Norms 
and Forbearance 
1. The Applied Nature of U.S. Universities.  At first glance, 
universities’ historical segregation from the patent system appears 
rather curious given the pragmatic orientation of U.S. academic 
institutions.12 Early American colleges and universities assumed a 
highly practical nature to help meet the needs of a young country.13 In 
this spirit, Thomas Jefferson established the University of Virginia in 
1825 to provide “an useful American education.”14 The decentralized 
nature of American universities contributed to this orientation; 
universities depended on local funding for revenue and thus had to be 
responsive to local economic and educational needs.15 A major 
development in orienting universities toward practical imperatives 
was the establishment of land-grant colleges in the mid-nineteenth 
century.16 Contrary to the largely “verbalistic” curricula of prior 
 
 12. See JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF 
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 26 (2005); Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, 
Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 253, 254 (1998) (“U.S. universities have long had a more practical orientation than 
universities in the United Kingdom or Germany.”); Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept 
University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39, 45 (“Certainly, in comparison with their 
European counterparts, U.S. universities have always displayed a pragmatic bent.”).  
 13. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 530–31, 534–35 (Gerald 
Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003) (noting the practical, applied nature of the American 
scientific mind).  
 14. WASHBURN, supra note 12, at 26. 
 15. Nathan Rosenberg & Richard R. Nelson, American Universities and Technical Advance 
in Industry, 23 RES. POL’Y 323, 325 (1994). 
 16. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–329 (2012); Jennifer L. Croissant & Laurel Smith-Doerr, 
Organizational Contexts of Science: Boundaries and Relationships between University and 
Industry, in THE HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES, 691, 692–93 (Edward J. 
Hacket, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch & Judy Wajcman eds., 3d ed. 2007); Yong S. Lee, 
‘Technology Transfer’ and the Research University: A Search for the Boundaries of University-
Industry Collaboration, 25 RES. POL’Y 843, 850 (1996) (“American higher education can be said 
to have roots in the landgrant philosophy embodied in the Morrill Act of 1862 and the Hatch 
Act of 1887, which emphasize service to industry and agriculture.”); Joshua E. Powers, 
Commercializing Academic Research: Resource Effects on Performance of University 
Technology Transfer, 74 J. HIGHER EDUC. 26, 45 (2003) (“[T]he economic development role for 
America’s research universities had historically centered on the land-grant institutions.”). Even 
before the Morrill Act of 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 301–305, 
307–309), the federal government granted land for the creation of public universities. Vernon 
Carstensen, A Century of the Land-Grant Colleges, 33 J. HIGHER EDUC. 30, 30 (1962).  
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universities,17 these colleges focused on solving practical problems18 
and providing instruction in agriculture and the mechanical arts.19 
This trend was bolstered by the establishment of Agricultural 
Experiment Stations under the direction of land-grant colleges.20 
Although these experiment stations conducted basic research, they 
were “‘in the business’ of developing findings and techniques that 
were ready for use by farmers” and had a clearly pragmatic 
character.21 Notably, these Agricultural Experiment Stations 
facilitated a public seed distribution system that disseminated the 
fruits of research free to the public.22 
Consistent with their practical orientation, many early U.S. 
universities cultivated close connections with industry.23 From 1890 to 
1900, several universities established partnerships with commercial 
entities in the Northeast industrial corridor.24 In an era of scarce 
public funds for research, universities relied substantially on private 
money for support.25 Universities played a key role in the 
development of new engineering and applied sciences disciplines26 as 
well as in the development of research-based pharmaceutical firms.27 
Rather than focusing exclusively on fundamental scientific principles, 
 
 17. Carstensen, supra note 16, at 35–36. 
 18. WASHBURN, supra note 12, at 29; Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology 
Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 
19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 333–34 (2008). 
 19. Morrill Act of 1862 § 4, 12 Stat. at 504; see Carstensen, supra note 16, at 31. Congress 
passed a second Morrill Act in 1890 that extended the land-grant college program to former 
Confederate states. Morrill Act of 1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 
321–326, 326a, 328). 
 20. 7 U.S.C. § 361a; see Carstensen, supra note 16, at 34–35. 
 21. Jeannette Colyvas, Michael Crow, Annetine Gelijns, Roberto Mazzoleni, Richard R. 
Nelson, Nathan Rosenberg & Bhaven N. Sampat, How Do University Inventions Get into 
Practice?, 48 MGMT. SCI. 61, 65 (2002); see Arthur D. Little, Industrial Research in America, 38 
SCIENCE 643, 649–50 (1913) (discussing examples of the experiment stations’ work and its 
practical character). 
 22. KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS 15 (2008). 
 23. Croissant & Smith-Doerr, supra note 16, at 691; Henry Etzkowitz, Entrepreneurial 
Science in the Academy: A Case of the Transformation of Norms, 36 SOC. PROBS. 14, 15 (1989). 
 24. GARY W. MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE UNIVERSITY 18 (1990). Some 
commentators around this time period, however, questioned the ability of universities to work 
with industry. See C.E. Kenneth Mess, The Organization of Industrial Scientific Research, 42 
SCIENCE 763, 766 (1916). 
 25. WASHBURN, supra note 12, at 34. 
 26. Rosenberg & Nelson, supra note 15, at 327. 
 27. Jeffrey L. Furman & Megan J. MacGarvie, Academic Science and the Birth of Industrial 
Research Laboratories in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 756, 
774 (2007). 
LEE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:47 PM 
10 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1 
much university research throughout the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries addressed practical problems in agriculture, 
public health, and industry.28 Particularly in the life sciences, 
relationships between universities and industry flourished between 
World War I and World War II.29 By 1940, 50 U.S. companies were 
supporting 270 biomedical research projects at 70 universities.30 
2. Antipatenting Norms.  Given the pragmatic orientation of U.S. 
universities, these institutions’ historical aversion to patenting might 
seem somewhat odd. However, scientific norms prioritizing 
communal sharing over individual property rights contributed to deep 
skepticism of patents.31 As sociologist Robert Merton documented in 
the early twentieth century, academic science relies heavily on the 
sharing of information, theories, and research materials for collective 
progress.32 Scientific knowledge thus constitutes “a common heritage 
in which the equity of the individual producer is severely limited.”33 
Drawing on his empirical work, Merton argued that science combines 
 
 28. Little, supra note 21, at 652; David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole 
Act of 1980 and University-Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD 
Governments?, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 115, 124 (2005). Of course, such commercial forays were 
not without their critics. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA: A 
MEMORANDUM ON THE CONDUCT OF UNIVERSITIES BY BUSINESS MEN 30 (1918); Dean Barus, 
Quotations: Research and Teaching, 57 SCIENCE 445, 446 (1923); Charles Baskerville, University 
and Industry, 30 SCIENCE 919, 920 (1916); H.A. Rowland, A Plea for Pure Science, 29 SCIENCE 
242, 243 (1883). By the 1920s, however, opinion had solidified among many academic scientists 
that universities could legitimately serve industrial interests. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE 
MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 139 (2003). 
 29. David Blumenthal, Academic-Industrial Relationships in the Life Sciences, 349 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2452, 2452 (2003). 
 30. Id.  
 31. Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, The University as 
Constructed Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365, 381 (2009); see Bhaven N. 
Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before and After 
Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772, 776 (2006) (“[I]t is likely that strong norms militating against 
academic patenting checked any ambitions universities may have had to patent in instances 
where publication or open dissemination would suffice for ‘technology transfer.’”(citing David 
C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Patents and Patent Policy Debates in the USA, 
1925–1980, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 781, 781 (2001)). 
 32. Merton’s empirical observations resonated with theoretical models of scientific 
progress. See, e.g., THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1996) 
(highlighting the importance of communal work in establishing and displacing scientific 
paradigms); Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 
MINERVA 54 (1962) (describing an autonomous scientific community with a high degree of 
internal communication). 
 33. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 273 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). 
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four normative pillars: universalism, communism, disinterestedness, 
and organized skepticism.34 Patents particularly conflict with the 
Mertonian norm of communism, the principle that “[t]he substantive 
findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are 
assigned to the community.”35 In a system in which scientists freely 
disclose their discoveries and build upon each other’s claims, 
individual property rights in scientific knowledge are whittled “down 
to a bare minimum.”36 As Merton observed, “The communism of the 
scientific ethos is incompatible with the definition of technology as 
‘private property’ in a capitalistic economy.”37 
Of course, Merton’s classic account of the communal norms of 
academic science has been subject to critique. Commentators argue 
that Merton’s norms are more “prescriptive” than “descriptive”38 and 
note that academic science has always exhibited secrecy, rivalry, and 
noncommunitarian incentives.39 Indeed, generalizations are difficult in 
this realm, for some institutions and scientists embraced patenting 
even in the early twentieth century. Some observers have disputed 
not the existence of academic sharing norms, but rather the perceived 
incompatibility of these norms with patents. Ironically, some early 
commentators cited the tenacity of communal norms as a safeguard 
that weighed in favor of patenting university discoveries; because 
scientists were so committed to disinterested inquiry, they argued, it 
was unlikely that patents and profit motives would adulterate 
research agendas.40 
 
 34. Id. at 270–78; Etzkowitz, supra note 23, at 14; see also Rai, supra note 7, at 89 (noting 
that other sociologists of science, such as Bernard Barber and Warren Hagstrom, came to 
similar conclusions). 
 35. MERTON, supra note 33, at 273. 
 36. Id.; see Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1047. 
 37. MERTON, supra note 33, at 275; see Margo Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary 
Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 226–27 (2006) (describing 
traditional norms of openly disclosing research results). 
 38. F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 697 (2001); see 
Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 328–29; see also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1048 n.128. 
 39. See Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 328–29 (“[T]he modem science establishment has 
long had the anti-Mertonian vices of secrecy, rivalry, and inducements outside of noble curiosity 
and concern for social welfare.” (footnote omitted)); Merges, supra note 7, at 147 (“The many 
limitations on truly public dissemination lead, in fact, to the conclusion that science is not so 
much given freely to the public as shared under a largely implicit code of conduct among a more 
or less well-identified circle of similarly situated scientists.”). 
 40. See C.J. HAMSON, PATENT RIGHTS FOR SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES 212 (1930). 
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Although subject to some debate, there is little doubt that 
academic norms of open disclosure and communal sharing informed 
universities’ early resistance to patenting. In the early twentieth 
century, many actors in academic science looked down upon 
patenting.41 Jacques Loeb of the Rockefeller Foundation, for 
example, warned that “if the institutions for pure science go into the 
handling of patents I am afraid pure science will be doomed.”42 The 
foundation even threatened to stop funding the research of UC 
Berkeley’s Herbert Evans if he tried to benefit financially from his 
research through patents.43 Following World War I, there was an 
international movement, primarily based in Europe, to protect 
“scientific property” with exclusive rights.44 Tellingly, however, this 
movement never gained much traction in the United States, and 
several committees of the National Research Council rejected the 
feasibility and desirability of establishing rights to scientific 
property.45 
Based in part on these traditional scientific norms, university 
scientists in the early twentieth century rarely patented their 
discoveries.46 Instances of patenting occasionally arose, however, and 
the first wave of meaningful university patenting occurred after 
 
 41. See, e.g., Etzkowitz, supra note 23, at 396 (describing the debate over patent policy at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the 1930s); Daniel J. Kevles, Principles, 
Property Rights, and Profits: Historical Reflections on University/Industry Tensions, 8 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 293, 295 (2001) (“Many [professors] had long contended, likely with 
the support of their administrators, that university science should be unadulterated by 
commercial considerations.”); Rai, supra note 7, at 88 (noting that communal norms largely 
governed the scientific community prior to 1980). 
 42. Charles Weiner, Universities, Professors, and Patents: A Continuing Controversy, TECH. 
REV., Feb.–Mar. 1986, at 33, 35; see also MATKIN, supra note 24, at 56. 
 43. BOK, supra note 28, at 139. 
 44. See, e.g., HAMSON, supra note 40, at 6; STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 844–72 (1930); Stephen B. Ladas, The Efforts for 
International Protection of Scientific Property, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 552–53 (1929); John H. 
Wigmore & Francesco Ruffini, Scientific Property, 22 ILL. L. REV. 355, 355 (1927). 
 45. Letter from Albert L. Barrows, Assistant Sec’y, Nat’l Acad. of Sci., to Dr. William 
Allen Pusey (Nov. 5, 1931) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Letter from Vernon Kellogg, 
Permanent Sec’y, Nat’l Acad. of Sci., to J. David Thompson, Sec’y, Am. Comm. on Int’l 
Intellectual Cooperation, Nat’l Research Council (May 2, 1928) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 46. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 781; Charles Weiner, Patenting in Academic 
Research: Historical Case Studies, 12 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 50, 50 (1987); see Elizabeth 
Popp Berman, Why Did Universities Start Patenting? Institution-Building and the Road to the 
Bayh-Dole Act, 38 SOC. STUD. SCI. 835, 841 (2008) (noting that “university patenting was clearly 
not institutionalized by the late 1960s”).  
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World War I.47 In the early twentieth century, scientific norms against 
exclusive rights in academic discoveries merged with institutional 
norms of serving the public interest to define a uniquely 
noncommercial approach to university patenting. 
3. University Patenting Policies.  Early patent policies on the part 
of universities reveal a unique academic skepticism of patents. To 
begin, many universities had no official patent policy prior to World 
War II,48 thus illustrating the peripheral status of intellectual property 
within academia. Even though the University of California required 
employees to report patentable inventions to the university starting in 
1926,49 it did not adopt a formal patent policy until 1943.50 Even more 
revealing, early patent policies heavily emphasized using patents to 
serve the public interest. Although a 1925 policy from Columbia 
University noted the university’s objective of financially benefitting 
from patents, it also stressed the importance of monitoring the quality 
of manufactured articles and ensuring that the public could obtain 
them at reasonable prices.51 The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s (MIT) first patent-ownership policy from 1932 was 
typical in stating that the university “shall hold and administer these 
rights for the ultimate benefit of the public.”52 
Universities were particularly reluctant to use patents to restrict 
access to health-related technologies. Harvard University decided in 
the 1920s to refuse to profit from faculty research in public health and 
therapeutics.53 Its 1934 patent policy stated, “No patents primarily 
concerned with therapeutics or public health may be taken out by any 
member of the University, except with the consent of the President 
 
 47. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 783. 
 48. Id. at 789. 
 49. David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat & Arvids A. Ziedonis, The 
Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99, 102 (2001). 
 50. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 62. 
 51. The Administration of Patents by Columbia University, 61 SCIENCE 382, 383 (1925); see 
also Archie M. Palmer, Medical Patents, 137 JAMA 497, 498 (1948) (“Patenting [medical] 
discoveries is not considered to be wrong in itself, but to be desirable in order to control them in 
the public interest.”).  
 52. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 62. This policy also cautioned against unduly encouraging 
faculty members to engage in invention at the expense of other academic duties. Henry 
Etzkowitz, Knowledge as Property: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Debate 
over Academic Patent Policy, 32 MINERVA 383, 399 (1994). 
 53. Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars out of DNA: The First Major Patent in 
Biotechnology and the Commercialization of Molecular Biology, 92 ISIS 541, 547 (2001). 
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and Fellows; nor will such patents be taken out by the University 
itself except for dedication to the public.”54 Similarly, Yale 
University’s 1934 policy stated that “it is, in general, undesirable and 
contrary to the best interests of medicine and the public to patent any 
discovery or invention applicable in the fields of public health or 
medicine.”55 An influential 1948 survey of patent policies confirmed 
similar policies at leading universities.56 According to the survey, 
many scientists felt that “the results of their research, both patentable 
and otherwise, should be shared ‘without fee or stipulation.’”57At 
Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Columbia, and Chicago, policies against 
patenting biomedical discoveries lasted until the 1970s.58 
4. University Patenting Practices.  Case studies of university 
patenting in the early twentieth century reveal deep anxiety over 
blending academia and commerce as well as a commitment to 
utilizing patents to serve the public interest. In 1907, Frederick 
Cottrell at UC Berkeley invented the electrostatic precipitator, a 
filtration device that removes harmful particles from flowing gases. In 
a rather novel move, he patented his discovery.59 He did not, however, 
assign his patent to UC Berkeley, for Cottrell was wary of the impact 
of patenting and licensing on scientific culture.60 For its part, the 
university was concerned that its charter did not permit involvement 
in commercial ventures.61 In 1912, motivated largely by a desire to 
separate the university from commercial concerns, Cottrell 
established an independent firm called Research Corporation to 
 
 54. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 69. Over the next forty years, “Harvard took out perhaps a 
half-dozen patents, dedicating all of them to the public.” Kevles, supra note 41, at 296. 
 55. Palmer, supra note 51, at 500. The policy, however, did allow patenting on a case-by-
case basis when necessary to protect the public interest as long as profits would not accrue to 
the scientist or the university. Id.  
 56. Id. at 498. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 791. At Harvard, this policy was only altered 
when the university entered into a sponsored research agreement with Monsanto, which 
received the right to secure exclusive licenses for all inventions arising from such research. See 
MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 58–60 (1986) 
(describing the agreement between Harvard Medical School and Monsanto). In 1975, Harvard 
adopted a new patent policy that “implicitly abandoned its commitment to dedicate patents in 
medical therapeutics and public health to the public.” Kevles, supra note 41, at 299. 
 59. U.S. Patent No. 895,729 (filed July 9, 1907). 
 60. Sampat, supra note 31, at 774. 
 61. Weiner, supra note 46, at 51. 
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manage his patents.62 Consistent with its academic origins, Research 
Corporation channeled whatever licensing revenues it generated back 
into funding scientific research. 
Academic, noncommercial norms also surrounded T. Brailsford 
Robertson’s patenting of tethelin. A decade after Cottrell, Robertson, 
also of UC Berkeley, discovered tethelin, a substance that promotes 
human tissue growth. He patented his invention63 and assigned his 
rights to the university, thus producing what may have been the first 
patents owned by the University of California.64 The Board of 
Regents of the University of California was initially reluctant to take 
the patents because of the perceived impropriety of a public 
university contracting with private firms.65 Indeed, this arrangement 
was so novel that Science magazine declared that it “should be 
subjected to careful scrutiny and the fullest possible criticism.”66 
Ultimately, the Regents established an independent patent-
management corporation, naming themselves as trustees, rather than 
taking title in the university itself.67 Throughout, Robertson and the 
university stressed their intention to use the patents to serve the 
public interest.68 Among other objectives, patenting would ensure that 
the University of California could monitor the quality of tethelin-
based therapies,69 thus safeguarding patient health. Notwithstanding 
these lofty goals, Robertson’s plan elicited significant criticism from 
an academic community deeply suspicious of patents.70 Johns Hopkins 
University later rejected Robertson as a candidate for a chair in 
physiology in part because he had patented tethelin.71 
 
 62. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 59–60; see F.G. Cottrell, Patent Experience of the Research 
Corporation, 28 TRANSACTIONS AM. INST. CHEM. ENGINEERS 222, 222–23 (1932). 
 63. U.S. Patent No. 1,218,472 (filed Oct. 8, 1915). Robertson also obtained British patent 
rights. U.K. Patent No. GB15683 (filed Nov. 6, 1915). 
 64. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 59. 
 65. Weiner, supra note 46, at 52. 
 66. T. Brailsford Robertson, The Utilization of Patents for the Promotion of Research, 46 
SCIENCE 371, 372 (1917). 
 67. See Rima D. Apple, Patenting University Research: Harry Steenbock and the Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation, 80 ISIS 375, 382 (1989). 
 68. See Robertson, supra note 66, at 371; Charles Weiner, Science in the Marketplace: 
Historical Precedents and Problems, in FROM GENETIC EXPERIMENTATION TO 
BIOTECHNOLOGY—THE CRITICAL TRANSITION 123, 125 (William J. Whelan & Sandra Black 
eds. 1982). 
 69. See Robertson, supra note 66, at 376. 
 70. Weiner, supra note 46, at 52. 
 71. BOK, supra note 28, at 139. Of course, not all academics opposed patenting. See, e.g., 
B.S. Hedrick, On Patent Laws as a Means for the Advancement of Science, 1 SCIENCE 166 
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The patenting of an antitoxin for scarlet fever also aroused 
considerable controversy. During World War I, researchers George 
and Gladys Dick of the University of Chicago developed an antitoxin 
for the bacterial toxin that causes scarlet fever.72 Concerned that low-
quality imitations of their product could jeopardize patient health, the 
Dicks decided to patent their discovery.73 After the American Medical 
Association declined to take the patents, the Dicks created an 
independent, nonprofit Scarlet Fever Committee to manage them.74 
Nonetheless, the Dicks received intense criticism from the medical 
community. In the 1920s, numerous editorials and articles criticized 
their decision to patent a substance with great therapeutic value.75 
The patenting of insulin further reflects academic skepticism of 
patents and the altruistic manner in which universities tried to use 
them. In 1923, researchers at the University of Toronto patented a 
method of making insulin and assigned it to the university.76 The 
decision to patent insulin was highly controversial and clashed with 
traditional norms discouraging the privatization of research 
discoveries.77 In making this decision, the researchers were influenced 
by the University of Minnesota’s patenting of thyroxin, which allowed 
the university to safeguard the commercial manufacture of related 
therapeutics.78 Following this model, the University of Toronto 
established an “insulin committee” in 1922 to manage the patent even 
 
(1880). Land-grant universities, which have a particularly applied orientation, were more open 
to patenting. Furthermore, patents in engineering aroused less suspicion than those in health 
and medicine. 
 72. Weiner, supra note 46, at 52.  
 73. Id. at 53. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.; see, e.g., George F. Dick & Gladys Henry Dick, Correspondence, The Patents in 
Scarlet Fever Toxin and Antitoxin, 88 JAMA 1341, 1341–42 (1927); Ethics and Patents, 16 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 919 (1926). 
 76. U.S. Patent No. 1,469,994 (filed Jan. 12, 1923). 
 77. Maurice Cassier & Christiane Sinding, ‘Patenting in the Public Interest:’ Administration 
of Insulin Patents by the University of Toronto, 24 HIST. & TECH. 153, 154 (2008); see Etzkowitz, 
supra note 52, at 383–84 (indicating that “large profits, public health and the reputation of the 
university were at stake” and that problems regarding the “creation of the private ownership of 
knowledge” needed resolution). 
 78. Cassier & Sinding, supra note 77, at 154–55. The inventors who patented thyroxin sold 
their rights to the University of Minnesota on the condition that the university manage the 
commercialization of the patent to serve the interests of the medical profession. Id. Accordingly, 
the university established a committee to manage the patent and “retained . . . strict control 
over the preparation, sale, and price of thyroxin” once it was licensed. Id. at 155. At the 
University of Toronto, the researchers declined to take any revenues from the insulin patent 
and assigned their rights to the university for one dollar each. Kevles, supra note 41, at 296. 
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before it was granted.79 The university was wary of monopolies on 
manufacturing insulin, so after granting Eli Lilly a one-year exclusive 
license for experimental development,80 the university nonexclusively 
and widely licensed the patent.81 In so doing, the university used the 
patent as “a tool to discipline the industrial world, to organize the 
distribution and use of the new drug, and to guarantee its 
accessibility.”82 Indeed, the university exploited its normative leverage 
as a public, academic institution in negotiations with commercial 
licensees.83 Ultimately, this “democratization of industrial property” 
facilitated the wide availability of manufactured insulin.84 
The University of Wisconsin’s patenting practices reveal both the 
public-minded nature of academic patenting as well as the high 
standard of conduct expected of academic entities. In the 1920s, 
university researcher Harry Steenbock invented a process for 
irradiating food with ultraviolet light, thus enhancing its vitamin D 
content.85 Steenbock’s process represented a promising treatment for 
rickets, a disease caused by vitamin D deficiency that particularly 
afflicted poor populations.86 Quite controversially,87 Steenbock 
obtained four patents related to irradiation technology.88 Steenbock’s 
motivations for patenting ranged from the altruistic to the parochial. 
On the one hand, he was influenced by the University of Toronto’s 
experience with insulin to utilize patents to ensure the “safest, most 
healthful dissemination” of irradiated foods.89 Additionally, he sought 
 
 79. Cassier & Sinding, supra note 77, at 155; Kevles, supra note 41, at 293–94. 
 80. Blumenthal, supra note 29, at 2452. 
 81. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 60; Cassier & Sinding, supra note 77, at 155. 
 82. Cassier & Sinding, supra note 77, at 156. 
 83. Id. at 166. 
 84. Id. at 160. 
 85. Weiner, supra note 46, at 55–57. 
 86. Id. at 55. 
 87. See Apple, supra note 67, at 378–79; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 788; Weiner, 
supra note 46, at 56. 
 88. U.S. Patent No. 2,057,399 (filed May 14, 1932); U.S. Patent No. 1,871,136 (filed Dec. 27, 
1926); U.S. Patent No. 1,871,135 (filed Dec. 27, 1926); U.S. Patent No. 1,680,818 (filed June 30, 
1924). 
 89. Apple, supra note 67, at 377; see Harry Steenbock & A. Black, Fat-Soluble Vitamins: 
The Induction of Growth-Promoting and Calcifying Properties in a Ration by Exposure to Ultra-
Violet Light, 61 J. BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY 405, 405 (1924) (“[T]o protect the interest of the 
public in the possible commercial use of these findings, applications for Letters Patent, both as 
to processes and products, have been filed with the United States Patent Office . . . .”); Harry 
Steenbock, The Induction of Growth Promoting and Calcifying Properties in a Ration by 
Exposure to Light, 60 SCIENCE 224, 225 (1924) (stating the same). 
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to preempt “patent pirates” who would patent inventions related to 
his discovery and then charge exorbitant fees for their application.90 
Furthermore, he aimed to generate licensing royalties to fund further 
research.91 On the other hand, Steenbock also sought to use patents to 
protect the local dairy industry in Wisconsin by keeping irradiation 
technology away from manufacturers of oleomargarine, the “butter of 
the poor.”92 Although some of his motivations were self-interested, 
Steenbock felt that as a scientist, he should distance himself and the 
university from the commercial, profit-making aspects of patenting.93 
For this and other reasons,94 Steenbock helped create the Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), an independent entity that 
manages the university’s patents.95 Tellingly, Steenbock initially 
refused to accept any share of royalties.96 In its rather sharp business 
practices, WARF was the exception that proved the rule regarding 
the norms of academic patenting. WARF received significant 
criticism for its hard-nosed business arrangements and threats of 
patent enforcement,97 which were all the more controversial given 
that they diverged from traditional academic patent practices. 
5. The Institutional Structure of University Patenting and 
Licensing.  Universities’ unease with patenting further manifested 
itself in the institutional separation of academic and patenting 
functions. The perceived impropriety of mixing academia and 
commerce, as well as the difficulty of managing patents, discouraged 
 
 90. Apple, supra note 67, at 377. Patent “piracy” was a commonly perceived problem in the 
early years of university patenting. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 784. 
 91. Apple, supra note 67, at 377. 
 92. Id. at 377–78. 
 93. Id. at 380; see RIMA APPLE, VITAMANIA: VITAMINS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 42 
(1996). 
 94. In addition, Steenbock had had some rather frustrating experiences with university 
administration in the past. Apple, supra note 67, at 381–83. 
 95. Weiner, supra note 68, at 127–28. 
 96. Apple, supra note 67, at 388. Steenbock later relented, partly at the urging of WARF, 
which argued that other inventors would not assign their patents to WARF without such 
inducement. Id. 
 97. See Etzkowitz, supra note 52, at 389; see also Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 788; 
H.A. Toulmin, Jr., Commercial Research by Universities Threatens Science and Education, 
PRODUCT ENGINEERING, June 1947, at 81, 82–82 (criticizing WARF for exploiting publicly 
sponsored technology while not granting licenses for products outside of the dairy industry); 
Weiner, supra note 46, at 56–57 (describing a 1943 U.S. Senate subcommittee hearing during 
which WARF was accused of abusing its patent rights); Monopoly On Vitamin D Charged, 
Official Denounces Research Foundation, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Oct. 21, 1943, at 5. 
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universities from directly handling patenting and licensing.98 
Accordingly, early forays into the patent system were marked by 
functional segregation. As noted, Cottrell created Research 
Corporation largely to insulate the University of California from the 
commercial aspects of patenting.99 In 1937, MIT signed an invention 
administration agreement with Research Corporation for similar 
reasons,100 and dozens of other universities followed suit.101 As 
described above, the University of California did not take title to 
Robertson’s tethelin patent directly but created an independent 
corporation to manage it.102 Finally, the WARF model proved very 
influential; by 1956 there were more than fifty similar, separately 
incorporated organizations handling university patents.103 As these 
examples demonstrate, anxiety over integrating universities into the 
patent system manifested itself even in the institutional structure of 
academic patenting. 
* * * 
In norms, policy, and practice, universities and university 
scientists sought to distance themselves from the commercial aspects 
of patents while utilizing exclusive rights to serve the public good. 
Throughout much of the twentieth century, universities shied away 
from direct involvement in patenting and licensing “because of fears 
that such involvement might compromise, or might be seen as 
compromising, their commitments to open science and their 
institutional missions to advance and disseminate knowledge.”104 
University entities were reluctant to patent scientific discoveries, 
particularly in the realm of health and medicine. Jonas Salk, the 
University of Pittsburgh researcher who developed the polio vaccine, 
famously declined to patent his discovery, noting, “Who owns my 
 
 98. Berman, supra note 46, at 842; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 782, 787; Palmer, 
supra note 51, at 508. Cottrell warned that any institution dealing with licensees “cannot avoid 
being eventually drawn into every phase of the problem” of technological development. 
Cottrell, supra note 62, at 225. 
 99. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 791. 
 100. Etzkowitz, supra note 52, at 403–04; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 788; Sampat, 
supra note 31, at 774–75. 
 101. Sampat, supra note 31, at 775. 
 102. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 103. Apple, supra note 67, at 390. 
 104. Sampat, supra note 31, at 774. 
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polio vaccine? The people! Could you patent the sun?”105 When 
universities did patent discoveries, they did so not simply to maximize 
revenues, but to ensure product safety, prevent patent piracy, and 
disseminate technologies widely to the public.106 Furthermore, 
institutional segregation helped buffer scientists and universities from 
the business of patents. 
B. Patent Law Viewing Academic Science: Separation and 
Exceptionalism 
While universities distanced themselves from patent law, patent 
doctrine also distanced itself from academic science. In several ways, 
patent courts created doctrinal hedges that tended to separate the 
fruits of academic science from the domain of exclusive rights.107 In 
some contexts, patent doctrine further engaged in academic 
exceptionalism by treating university entities differently than other 
actors in the patent system. Such separation and exceptionalism arose 
from multiple factors, including a prudential desire to keep 
“upstream” discoveries in the public domain and to not burden 
nonprofit research with patents. Notably, they arose in part from 
courts’ perception of the noncommercial character of university 
science. The communal, public-spirited norms of academic research 
and technological development helped inform a rhetorical vision of 
universities that helped justify—or at least rationalize—a hands-off 
approach to academic science. A stable equilibrium thus emerged 
between noncommercial patenting practices by university entities and 
academic exceptionalism in patent doctrine. 
1. Patentable Subject Matter.  The doctrinal separation of 
academic science from patent law is best illustrated in the law of 
 
 105. Sara Boettiger & Brian D. Wright, Open Source in Biotechnology: Open Questions, 
INNOVATIONS, Fall 2006, at 45, 48; see also Josephine Johnston & Angela A. Wasunna, Patents, 
Biomedical Research, and Treatments: Examining Concerns, Canvassing Solutions, HASTINGS 
CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2007, at S2, S2. A significant funder of Salk’s research, the National 
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (now the March of Dimes), did not allow patents or the 
receipt of royalties for funded inventions. Seth Shulman, Cashing in on Medical Knowledge, 
MIT TECH. REV. Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 38, 42. 
 106. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 784–85. 
 107. Cf. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an 
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 462 (2004) (arguing that a traditional 
distinction between basic and applied science was “essentially hardwired into law”). 
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patentable subject matter.108 Drawing on English antecedents,109 U.S. 
doctrine has long prohibited patenting abstract principles and natural 
properties, thus excluding raw scientific discoveries from 
patentability.110 In 1852, the Supreme Court observed: 
It is admitted, that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these 
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an 
exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, 
should one be discovered in addition to those already 
known. . . . The same may be said of electricity, and of any other 
power in nature, which is alike open to all, and may be applied to 
useful purposes by the use of machinery.111 
The next year, Justice Grier, dissenting in the famous case of O’Reilly 
v. Morse,112 stated: 
  The mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of 
nature, without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the 
subject of a patent. But he who takes this new element or power, as 
yet useless, from the laboratory of the philosopher, and makes it the 
servant of man . . . is the benefactor to whom the patent law tenders 
its protection.113 
Lower courts reiterated this distinction between the “laboratory of 
the philosopher” and the domain of patentable technologies. In 1862, 
the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York stated that 
patentable subject matter arises “beyond the mere domain of 
discovery,” when an inventor has directed some principle, force, or 
 
 108. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining patentable subject matter as “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof”). The statutory definition of patentable subject matter has remained largely unchanged 
over the history of the U.S. patent system. 
 109. Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 ENG. REP. 651, 667 (Ct. Com. Pl.) (opinion of Lord Eyre, 
C.J.) (“Undoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle.”); see Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 63 (2011). 
 110. Peter Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law 
Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine To Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 92–98 (2005). The exclusion of abstract ideas and natural products from 
patentable subject matter tends to “force[] patents downstream, away from unfinished research 
and toward completed products or processes more suitable for the market.” DAN L. BURK & 
MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 124 (2009). 
 111. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1853).  
 112. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
 113. Id. at 132–33 (Grier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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law to act on “the material world.”114 Similarly, in 1895, the Ninth 
Circuit held that employing a scientific discovery in the same fashion 
as it is applied in nature is not patentable.115 Notably, the court 
invoked this distinction to invalidate three of WARF’s irradiation 
patents in 1943, observing that the patent statute aimed to reward the 
“inventor,” not the “pure scientist.”116  
The segregation of academic discoveries from the patent system 
was further corroborated by cases holding that natural phenomena 
are not eligible for patenting.117 As the Supreme Court stated in 1948, 
“He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no 
claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be 
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of 
the law of nature to a new and useful end.”118 Thus the passive 
observation of nature, a primary function of academic science, does 
not yield patentable subject matter. 
Courts’ traditional exclusion of natural laws, natural phenomena, 
and abstract principles from patentability arose from several 
rationales, at least some of which resonate with the traditional 
Mertonian norms discussed above.119 For example, patentable subject 
matter doctrine reflected a communalistic theory of technological 
progress in which scientists and inventors could draw from a shared 
pool of upstream basic knowledge to further their research and 
develop downstream technologies.120 As economist Richard Nelson 
observes, “For this reason scientists have long argued for free and 
wide communication of research results, and for this reason natural 
‘laws’ and facts are not patentable.”121 This sentiment is reflected in 
 
 114. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865) 
(emphasis added). 
 115. Wall v. Leck, 66 F. 552, 558 (9th Cir. 1895) (citing 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW 
OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 186 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co., 1890)).  
 116. Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 
295 (9th Cir. 1943). 
 117. See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); Ex 
Parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123, 125 (1889); see also Hector M. Holmes, Book 
Review, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1428, 1432 (1932) (reviewing C.J. HAMSON, PATENT RIGHTS FOR 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES (1930)). 
 118. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); see Sarnoff, supra 
note 109, at 89. 
 119. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 63–68 
(2008). 
 121. Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. 
ECON. 297, 302 (1959). 
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patent decisions likening natural phenomena and abstract principles 
to “basic tools of scientific and technological work” that must remain 
in the public domain.122 
Additionally, courts also justified excluding academic findings 
from patentability based on the noncommercial nature of academic 
research. As the Second Circuit observed in 1944, 
Epoch-making “discoveries” of “mere” general scientific “laws,” 
without more, cannot be patented. So the great “discoveries” of 
Newton or Faraday could not have been rewarded with such a grant 
of monopoly. Interestingly enough, apparently many scientists like 
Faraday care little for monetary rewards; generally the motives of 
such outstanding geniuses are not pecuniary. Perhaps (although no 
one really knows) the same cannot be said of those lesser geniuses 
who put such discoveries to practical uses.123 
In this regard, the Second Circuit invoked the Mertonian image of the 
financially disinterested scientist.124 This image had some empirical 
support. The opinion cites scholarship by economist Paul Howard 
Douglas noting that prominent scientists such as Michael Faraday, 
James Maxwell, Charles Darwin, Louis Pasteur, and Louis Agassiz 
were not motivated by profits in their scientific research.125 Rather, 
intellectual passion and a genuine excitement for discovery trumped 
other motivations.126 The rhetorical trope of the noble, financially 
disinterested scientist thus provided another rationale for excluding 
natural laws and other academic discoveries from patentable subject 
matter.127 
2. Utility.  Moving beyond patentable subject matter, the doctrine 
of utility also tended to drive a wedge between academic science and 
 
 122. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 
(1978). 
 123. Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944) (footnotes omitted). 
 124. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. 
 125. Paul H. Douglas, The Reality of Non-Commercial Incentives in Economic Life, in THE 
TREND OF ECONOMICS 153, 156–62 (1924). 
 126. Notably, nonfinancial incentives were important not only for traditional “men of 
science” but also for “‘practical’ scientists” working in industry. Id. at 173–74.  
 127. This perception that scientists are not motivated by profit continued to hold much 
sway. See Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 348 n.9 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(“Yet patent law has never been the domain of the abstract—one cannot patent the very 
discoveries which make the greatest contributions to human knowledge, such as Einstein’s 
discovery of the photoelectric effect, nor has it ever been considered that the lure of commercial 
award provided by a patent was needed to encourage such contributions.”). 
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the patent system.128 While utility is a relatively low bar to 
patentability,129 it has particular traction in the context of academic 
science. In Brenner v. Manson,130 the Supreme Court ruled in 1966 
that a process for producing chemical compounds of no known utility 
failed the substantial utility requirement of patentability.131 The case 
does not deal with an academic invention per se. Notably, however, 
the process failed the utility requirement even though the chemicals it 
produced were under academic investigation for potential anticancer 
properties.132 Evoking principles consistent with academic norms 
against privatizing foundational discoveries, the Court cautioned, 
Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a product 
shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not 
capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and 
perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block 
off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating 
benefit to the public.133 
Citing the Second Circuit’s decision in Katz v. Horni Signal 
Manufacturing Corp., the Court further observed that “‘[a] patent 
system must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the 
realm of philosophy.’”134 Lower courts followed Brenner’s teaching 
that intermediates in the production of compounds of no known 
utility lack utility themselves.135 Furthermore, courts extended this 
rationale to the disclosure requirements of patentability, reasoning 
that a patent application that does not disclose a utility also does not 
enable any claimed invention.136 In a traditional mid-twentieth-century 
paradigm in which university research generally focused on upstream 
 
 128. As Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have observed, limitations on patentable 
subject matter worked “hand in hand” with utility doctrine to exclude upstream research tools 
from patents. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 110, at 124. 
 129. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 211 (5th ed. 2011) (“The vast majority of patent applications 
are processed without the PTO raising any question as to utility, and the utility doctrine is also 
rarely litigated as a defense in infringement actions.”). 
 130. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) 
 131. Id. at 535–36. 
 132. Id. at 532. 
 133. Id. at 534 (footnote omitted). 
 134. Id. at 536 (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A 1965)) (citing Katz v. 
Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1944)). 
 135. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 939 (C.C.P.A. 
1967).  
 136. See supra note 135.  
LEE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:47 PM 
2013] PATENTS AND THE UNIVERSITY 25 
discoveries, the utility doctrine tended to restrict the patentability of 
academic inventions. 
3. The Common Law Experimental Use Exception.  Patent law 
erected boundaries between itself and academic science not only in 
doctrines governing patentability, but also in the law of infringement. 
The clearest example of such exceptionalism is the common law 
experimental use exception, which exempts from liability the 
unlicensed use of patented technology for noncommercial purposes.137 
Justice Story laid the foundation for this doctrine in the 1813 case of 
Whittemore v. Cutter,138 in which he stated, “[I]t could never have 
been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed 
such a[n infringing] machine merely for philosophical experiments, or 
for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to 
produce its described effects.”139 Elsewhere, Justice Story equated 
infringing use of an invention with “the making with an intent to use 
for profit,” in contradistinction with use for mere “philosophical 
experiment” or to confirm details contained in the patent 
specification.140 This conception of experimental use proved highly 
influential;141 one well-regarded 1890 treatise states that “no act [is] an 
infringement unless it affects the pecuniary interests of the owner of 
the patented invention.”142 Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
“the issue of whether experimentation amounted to patent 
infringement seemed to have been clearly resolved”143 in favor of 
experimenters. 
 
 137. The experimental use exception has attracted significant scholarly attention. See, e.g., 
Eisenberg, supra note 7; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 1018 
(2003); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to 
Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Elizabeth A. 
Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special 
Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? 
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81. The experimental use exception 
has rarely been a successful defense in patent litigation. See, e.g., Rowe, supra, at 926 n.18 
(finding only four cases in which accused infringers successfully claimed experimental use as a 
defense).  
 138. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). 
 139. Id. at 1121; see Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 458; Strandburg, supra note 137, at 84.  
 140. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391); see also 
Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279). 
 141. Mueller, supra note 137, at 20. 
 142. 3 ROBINSON, supra note 115, § 898; see Mueller, supra note 137, at 20–21. 
 143. Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 457–58. 
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The vast majority of cases involving the experimental use 
exception do not involve academic experimentation with patented 
inventions per se.144 However, one early case suggested that use of a 
patented invention for academic research qualified for the safe 
harbor. In Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing,145 the Stearns-Roger 
Manufacturing Company was found to have infringed a patent related 
to mining technology.146 In conducting an accounting, however, the 
district court excluded sales of materials to the Colorado School of 
Mines that could be used to make an infringing device. The court 
concluded that some of these parts “were for use in laboratory 
machines used for experimental purposes, and consequently did not 
contribute to an infringing use.”147 The court went on to note that 
“[t]he making or using of a patented invention merely for 
experimental purposes, without any intent to derive profits or 
practical advantage therefrom, is not infringement.”148 Although this 
is a singular case, it suggests a privileged status for university research 
based on its noncommercial nature. Whether or not this approach 
was correct as a doctrinal matter, for several decades, many university 
scientists believed that the experimental use exception immunized 
nonprofit-university research from infringement.149 Indeed, “most 
academic institutions freely infringed patents” until the Federal 
Circuit revisited this issue again in the early twenty-first century.150 
4. Remedies.  Though more speculative, there is one prominent 
case involving a court extending rather exceptional treatment to a 
university patentee in the context of remedies. In Vitamin 
Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation,151 
 
 144. See, e.g., Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 376 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Dugan v. 
Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 
F. Supp. 305, 333 (N.D. W. Va. 1937); Standard Measuring Mach. Co. v. Teague, 15 F. 390, 392–
93 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883). 
 145. Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935). 
 146. Id. at 699; see Jeffrey R. Armstrong, Bayh-Dole Under Siege: The Challenge to Federal 
Patent Policy as a Result of Madey v. Duke University, 30 J.C. & U.L. 619, 627 (2004); see 
Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1018. 
 147. Ruth, 13 F. Supp. at 703. 
 148. Id. at 713. 
 149. Ed Ergenzinger & Murray Spruill, Basic Science in U.S. Universities Can Infringe 
Patents, SCIENTIST, Mar. 10, 2003, at 43, 43; Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an 
Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 633 (1985). 
 150. Rowe, supra note 137, at 928. 
 151. Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 
1944). 
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WARF sued Vitamin Technologists for infringing the irradiation 
patents of University of Wisconsin researcher (and WARF co-
founder) Harry Steenbock.152 The Ninth Circuit ruled for the 
defendants, invalidating all or portions of Steenbock’s three patents.153 
In doing so, however, the court also made several influential 
statements on the inappropriateness of injunctive relief in that case. 
The subtext of the case was that WARF sought to enjoin Vitamin 
Technologists’ irradiation of oleomargarine to protect Wisconsin’s 
dairy interests. Such enforcement would have disproportionately 
harmed poor communities, which favored the less expensive 
oleomargarine over butter itself.154 Considering all these factors, the 
court noted that injunctive relief would have been inappropriate: 
The evidence and appellee’s briefs are replete with well verified 
statements of the great boon to humanity of Dr. Steenbock’s 
scientific discoveries for the prevention and cure of rickets. The 
truth of such statements make the stronger the contention that it is a 
public offense to withhold such processes from any of the principal 
foods of the rachitic poor, or, indeed, from those of any such 
sufferers.155 
This dictum suggested that WARF’s patents should not constrain 
access to an important discovery with great potential to enhance 
social welfare. This rationale was at odds with prevailing Supreme 
Court doctrine at the time, which held that patentees had no 
obligation to use (or license) their patents.156 Though a singular 
instance—and one should not infer too much—this case represents a 
prominent example of a court eschewing strict enforcement of a 
university patent to serve the public interest. 
* * * 
In sum, there appears to be some reciprocity between norms and 
doctrine in the early history of university patenting. Scientific norms 
discouraged patenting, and universities sought to avoid the taint of 
commercialism in their early patent practices. In reciprocal fashion, in 
a variety of doctrinal areas, patent courts historically excluded the 
 
 152. Id. at 941. 
 153. Id. at 941, 949, 951–52. 
 154. Id. at 943–44. 
 155. Id. at 945. 
 156. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). 
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fruits of academic science from patentability or treated academic 
entities differently from commercial actors. Notably, these doctrinal 
hedges significantly paralleled the traditional academic and public-
interest norms that governed university science. The outputs of basic 
research did not comprise patentable subject matter partly because 
retaining these resources in the public domain would best promote 
technological progress. Furthermore, patents and associated profit 
motives were not necessary to motivate academics to generate such 
discoveries, thus weighing against extending patent protection to such 
discoveries. Additionally, courts were reluctant to extend 
infringement liability to academic research, which was 
noncommercial in nature. Ultimately, an integrated system emerged 
where prevailing academic norms and patent doctrine achieved a 
rough equilibrium. As we will see, this mutually segregating 
equilibrium based on noncommercial norms and academic 
exceptionalism would not last, and a very different one would take its 
place. 
II.  TRANSITION: PATENTS ENTER THE ACADEMY 
This equilibrium began to shift as academic institutions started to 
vastly increase their patenting activity. Though most observers situate 
the rise of university patenting at the end of the twentieth century,157 
antecedents earlier in that century contributed to this development. 
To generate large numbers of patentable inventions, universities 
needed more significant sources of research funding than the private 
trusts and donations upon which they had historically relied. To this 
end, massive increases in federal science funding during World War II 
infused universities with money.158 Key technological advances—from 
the mass production of penicillin to the Manhattan Project—helped 
win the war and revealed to policymakers the importance of large-
scale science funding. Vannevar Bush, who served as chief science 
advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, argued forcefully for 
 
 157. See, e.g., Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1374 (1999) 
(noting that the Bayh-Dole Act, which was passed in 1980, “set the stage for modern university 
licensing”). 
 158. See MATKIN, supra note 24, at 20; WASHBURN, supra note 12, at 121; Rosenberg & 
Nelson, supra note 15, at 334 (“World War II was a watershed in the history of American 
science and technology and, in particular, led to a dramatic change in the roles played by 
American universities in scientific and technical enterprises.”). Actually, federal research 
funding had already increased sharply during World War I, which also saw the establishment of 
the National Research Council. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 18. 
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expansive science funding to continue after the war,159 particularly in 
medicine and public health.160 Federal science funding increased 
markedly in the first post-war decade and accelerated even faster in 
the late 1950s.161 
Notably, increased funding of university science was not framed 
in an imperative of immediate commercialization. Bush fully expected 
federal funds to facilitate the development of medicines, labor-saving 
devices, and other applied technologies.162 However, he rejected left-
leaning calls for government to directly manage scientific research to 
satisfy immediate social and economic needs.163 Rather, he 
championed undirected scientific work and “basic” research, which 
promised significant, though unpredictable, long-term benefits.164 
Accordingly, the orientation of university research shifted after 
World War II away from short-term problem solving toward 
addressing more fundamental issues.165 Within this linear model of 
technological advance, federal funding and university research 
created an upstream “reservoir of knowledge” that would facilitate 
downstream technological development.166 This linear model of 
scientific and technological progress paralleled philosopher of science 
Michael Polanyi’s conception of an autonomous “republic of science” 
that would receive public support but remain insulated from political, 
social, and market influences.167 It also resonated with traditional 
Mertonian norms of noncommercial academic research and 
communal progress. 
As the Cold War waned, however, federal policy shifted. 
Policymakers began to deemphasize military superiority and focus 
 
 159. See VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE: THE ENDLESS FRONTIER 11, 31 (1945). 
 160. STEPHEN P. STRICKLAND, POLITICS, SCIENCE, AND DREAD DISEASE: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MEDICAL RESEARCH POLICY 22 (1972); Blumenthal, supra note 
29, at 2453. 
 161. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 793. 
 162. BUSH, supra note 159, at 10–11. 
 163. Id. at 18. 
 164. Id.; Rosenberg & Nelson, supra note 15, at 335. 
 165. Lee, supra note 16, at 850. 
 166. Timothy L. Faley & Michael Sharer, Technology Transfer and Innovation: Reexamining 
and Broadening the Perspective of the Transfer of Discoveries Resulting from Government-
Sponsored Research, COMP. TECH. TRANSFER & SOC’Y, Aug. 2005, at 109, 111 & fig.1. See 
generally BUSH, supra note 159. 
 167. See Polanyi, supra note 32, at 54, 56; see also Kevles, supra note 41, at 297–98 (arguing 
that the federal government’s massive funding of academic research lessened universities’ need 
to partner with industry and served to shore up antipatenting norms). 
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more on ensuring U.S. global economic competitiveness.168 They 
began to question the linear theory of technological advance that 
largely segregated upstream academic research from downstream 
commercialization. A consensus emerged that knowledge flow 
between academic science and industry is bidirectional169 and that 
innovation was best served by collaborative relationships spanning 
the “triple helix” of government, academia, and industry.170 As a 
result, federal science policy began to focus more on downstream 
research, technology transfer, and commercialization.171 
These policy shifts ultimately culminated in the Bayh-Dole Act 
(“the Act”). While the conventional view holds that the Act fueled a 
vast increase in university patenting, academic patenting was already 
on the rise at the time of its enactment.172 Responding to criticisms 
that government-owned patents were not being commercialized,173 the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had 
established a system of Institutional Patent Agreements (IPAs) in the 
late 1960s. Under IPAs, universities with approved technology 
transfer capabilities could retain title to patents on federally funded 
inventions and grant exclusive licenses to firms.174 Indeed, policy shifts 
that threatened IPAs175 helped motivate support for the Bayh-Dole 
Act by universities that already enjoyed the benefits of patenting 
federally funded inventions.176 
HEW’s policy changes fed into the broader debate over who 
should take title to patents arising from government-funded 
 
 168. BOK, supra note 28, at 11. 
 169. Fiona Murray, Innovation as Co-Evolution of Scientific and Technological Networks: 
Exploring Tissue Engineering, 31 RES. POL’Y 1389, 1391 (2002). 
 170. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural 
Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 119–22, 132 (2001). 
 171. Id. 
 172. DAVID C. MOWERY, RICHARD NELSON, BHAVEN SAMPAT & ARVIDS ZIEDONIS, 
IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 104 (2004). 
Public universities, which focused more on applied research and had incentives to provide a 
return on taxpayer investments, were more active in patenting than private institutions prior to 
the Bayh-Dole Act. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 28, at 119. 
 173. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1691 (1996). 
 174. Id. at 1691–92; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 795. 
 175. See Berman, supra note 46, at 854; Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 1692; Mowery & 
Sampat, supra note 31, at 795. 
 176. See Colyvas et al., supra note 21, at 62; Sampat, supra note 31, at 780. 
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research.177 For several decades, federal agencies pursued different 
approaches: some took title to patents themselves while others 
allowed grantees (such as universities) to take title to patents, 
reserving only a license for themselves.178 In the late 1970s, concerns 
grew that government-owned patents were stifling innovation, as 
firms would not develop inventions into commercial products without 
possessing exclusive rights. Empirical evidence corroborated these 
concerns,179 which were exacerbated by perceptions of lagging 
economic competitiveness relative to Europe and Japan.180 Political 
momentum began to grow in favor of reforming federal policy 
governing the ownership of publicly funded inventions. 
To spur the commercialization of these inventions, Congress 
passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.181 The Act allowed and 
encouraged small businesses and nonprofits that received government 
funds to take title to patents arising from federally funded research.182 
Congress enacted this legislation on the view that exclusive rights 
were necessary to motivate additional private investment to develop 
patented inventions into commercial products.183 This made intuitive 
sense for small-business grantees that could themselves develop 
 
 177. See Memorandum of Aug. 23, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (1971); Memorandum of Oct. 
10, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (1963); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1 INVESTIGATIONS OF 
GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT 2, 89–90 (1947). 
 178. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 173. 
 179. In the 1970s, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had a 
commercialization rate of less than 1 percent for inventions under its free-use policy but 18 to 20 
percent for inventions for which contractors controlled patents. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry 
Avorn, University-Based Science and Biotechnology Products: Defining the Boundaries of 
Intellectual Property, 293 JAMA 850, 851 (2005). The statistical case in favor of the Bayh-Dole 
Act is suspect, however, in light of significant selection bias. Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 1702–
05. 
 180. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt.1, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 
6460–61; H.R. REP. NO. 96-1006, pt. 1, at 17 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 1 (1979). 
 181. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)).  
 182. In 1984, President Reagan extended this policy to large business contractors, and 
Congress enacted this extension the same year. See Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. 98-620, § 501(13), 98 Stat. 3335, 3367–68 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 210(c) (2006)); S. REP. NO. 
98-662, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5799, 5800; Memorandum to the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies: Government Patent Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 
1983). 
 183. See Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 1669. This is, of course, a highly contested premise. 
Some university inventions—including certain research tools—do not require additional 
development for useful exploitation. In this context, patents may simply increase price and 
decrease access with little offsetting social gain.  
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patented inventions into commercial products. For universities, 
however, patents were seen as a necessary conduit for transferring 
federally funded technologies to the private sector for 
commercialization. While grantees certainly benefitted from the Act, 
federal funding agencies retained several rights in subject inventions. 
For example, under the Act, agencies can prevent grantees from 
taking title to patents in “exceptional circumstances.”184 Additionally, 
agencies receive a paid-up nonexclusive license to practice subject 
inventions185 and can “march-in” to compulsorily license inventions in 
certain circumstances.186 Ultimately, the Act represented a significant 
statutory and policy innovation.187 Among other effects, it created 
enormous commercial opportunities for universities and reflected a 
public policy of greater engagement between academia, the patent 
system, and industry.188 
In addition to legislative reforms, scientific advances and the 
changing nature of university research also helped accelerate 
academic patenting.189 In particular, the birth of the biotechnology 
industry in university laboratories helped fuel this trend.190 In the 
1970s, Stanley Cohen of Stanford University and Herbert Boyer of 
the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) developed and 
patented the pioneering techniques of recombinant DNA 
 
 184. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006). 
 185. Id. § 202(c)(4). 
 186. Id. § 203. 
 187. See Croissant & Smith-Doerr, supra note 16, at 693 (characterizing the 1980 passage of 
the Bayh-Dole Act as marking a new “pivotal phase” in university-industry research 
relationships); Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 464. 
 188. The Bayh-Dole Act was not the only legislation that helped encourage university 
patenting. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. V 2011)) (expanding universities’ ability to 
conduct industry-sponsored research while maintaining tax-exempt status); Federal Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 12, 100 Stat. 1785, 1785 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 3710a (2006)) (enabling cooperative research and development agreements between 
private entities and federal laboratories); Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, Pub. 
L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (1980) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 
(2012)) (promoting the patenting and licensing of taxpayer-funded inventions at federal 
laboratories).  
 189. See Richard Nelson, Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of Patenting at American 
Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 13, 14 (2001). 
 190. Colyvas et al., supra note 21, at 61–62; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 793–94. See 
generally Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 343–46. 
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technology.191 Biotechnology generated enormous enthusiasm on 
university campuses, as it promised significant therapies and large 
revenues for academic patentees.192 It also sparked increased 
industrial support for university research. Between 1980 and 1983, 
pharmaceutical companies contributed $140 million to research 
conducted at thirteen universities.193 By 1990, genetic engineering and 
recombinant DNA represented the technological class in which 
universities owned the highest proportion of patents.194 
The emergence of biotechnology also reflected a shift in the 
nature of university research. Toward the end of the twentieth 
century, university researchers, particularly in the life sciences, 
developed greater facility (and interest) in moving beyond the passive 
observation of nature to actively manipulating the basic building 
blocks of life. More broadly, much contemporary academic research 
in the life sciences proceeds in “Pasteur’s Quadrant”: although it 
seeks to elucidate “basic” knowledge, it also has immediate practical 
implications.195 Due to the changing nature of university research, 
even basic investigations can yield outputs that directly or with little 
modification satisfy legal definitions of patentability. 
Developments in the patent system also spurred greater 
university patenting. In 1980, the Supreme Court held in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty196 that a genetically engineered bacterium comprised 
patentable subject matter.197 In so doing, the Court articulated an 
expansive conception of patentable subject matter198 that 
encompassed many of the fruits of the nascent biotechnology field (as 
 
 191. See generally Stanley N. Cohen, Annie C.Y. Chang, Herbert W. Boyer & Robert B. 
Helling, Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 3240 (1973); Hughes, supra note 53. 
 192. Nicholas S. Argyres & Julia Porter Liebeskind, Privatizing the Intellectual Commons: 
Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology, 35 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 427, 434 
(1998). Notably, this vast commercial potential was based upon federally funded research. 
KENNEY, supra note 58, at 241. 
 193. Blumenthal, supra note 29, at 2453. 
 194. Rosenberg & Nelson, supra note 15, at 339. 
 195. See generally DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1997); Francis Narin, Kimberly S. Hamilton & Dominic 
Olivastro, The Increasing Linkage Between U.S. Technology and Public Science, 26 RES. POL’Y 
317, 317 (1997); Rosenberg & Nelson, supra note 15, at 324. 
 196. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 197. Id. at 303. 
 198. See id. at 309 (suggesting that “‘anything under the sun that is made by man’” is eligible 
for patenting (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2399)). 
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well other fields, such as computer science).199 As discussed further 
below, this and other decisions widened the door for university 
patents.200 Furthermore, just two years after Chakrabarty, Congress 
established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,201 which 
soon emerged as “a strong champion of patentholder rights.”202 The 
Federal Circuit helped create a climate even more conducive to filing 
patent applications, including those from university scientists. 
 
Figure 1. Annual Utility Patent Grants As a Percentage of Utility 
Patent Grants in 1970 (1970–2008)203 
 
 
 199. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 172, at 103; Bagley, supra note 37, at 235. 
 200. See infra notes 312–18 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Bagley, supra note 37, at 231; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A 
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). 
 202. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 172, at 103. 
 203. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNIVERSITY-EXTENDED: NUMBER OF PATENTS 
GRANTED BY YEAR OF PATENT GRANT, BREAKOUT BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (TABLE A1-1A) 
AND BY OWNERSHIP CATEGORY (TABLE A1-1B) (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); 
Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: 
Calendar Years 1963–2012, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
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This constellation of legal, economic, and scientific developments 
created a perfect storm that helped fuel a rapid rise in university 
patenting after 1980. In 1965, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) granted 96 patents to 28 U.S. universities or related 
institutions.204 In 1992, a little over a decade after the Act, the USPTO 
granted almost 1,500 patents to over 150 U.S. universities or related 
institutions.205 By 2002, academic institutions were receiving more 
than 3,000 patents per year.206 From 1980 to 2005, the average number 
of patents granted to U.S. research institutions increased by more 
than 480 percent.207 The next Part considers the impact of this 
development on the norms of university science and concomitant 
doctrinal responses by courts in patent cases. 
III.  THE CONTEMPORARY LANDSCAPE: ACADEMIC 
INTERNALIZATION AND THE DEMISE OF EXCEPTIONALISM 
Whereas traditional relationships between universities and the 
patent system were marked by segregation, they are now 
characterized by a high degree of mutual internalization. This Part 
briefly surveys the internalization of patents within academic culture, 
a phenomenon that has attracted significant attention. It then focuses 
on the less appreciated ways that university science has been 
internalized within patent doctrine. Increasingly, academic 
inventions, norms, and practices are the subject of patent litigation 
and doctrine. And patent courts increasingly view universities as fully 
integrated into the central, profit-oriented narrative of the patent 
system. Ultimately, these normative and institutional shifts have 
helped lead courts to reject academic exceptionalism in patent 
doctrine. 
 
 204. Rebecca Henderson, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Universities as a Source of 
Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965–1988, 80 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 119, 119 (1998). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 179, at 851. 
 207. Gregory K. Sobolski, John H. Barton & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Technology Licensing: 
Lessons from the US Experience, 294 JAMA 3137, 3137 (2005). 
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A. Academic Science Viewing Patent Law: Increased Patenting and 
Attendant Cultural Shifts 
As legal, economic, and scientific developments pushed 
universities deeper into the patent system, many academic institutions 
and individuals underwent a notable cultural shift. 
1. Evolving Norms and Universities’ Embrace of Patenting.  
Through a long (and still ongoing) process of norm contestation, 
academic culture has become much more receptive to exclusive rights 
and the commercial exploitation of scientific knowledge.208 The rise in 
patenting following the Bayh-Dole Act has challenged traditional 
norms of openness and communal sharing and led to “the emergence 
of new norms about how science should be done.”209 Although 
universities used to be wary of patents, many now zealously embrace 
them,210 and faculty members actively seek to exploit the “pecuniary 
content of knowledge.”211 Professors Henry Etzkowitz and Andrew 
Webster observe that “science and property, formerly independent 
and even opposed concepts referring to distinctively different kinds of 
activities and social spheres, have been made contingent upon each 
other through the concept of ‘intellectual property rights.’”212 These 
shifts mark a significant evolution away from the communalistic 
norms Merton described in the early twentieth century. 
Of course, although it is easy to characterize universities’ 
embrace of patenting as a stark break from prior practices, one 
should not paint with too broad a brush. First, as noted above, the 
notion that academia has always been a bastion of Mertonian sharing 
norms may be unduly romantic.213 Second, strong antipatent norms 
continue to persist (and will likely always persist) in some areas of 
academia.214 Third, institutions and individuals are not monolithic, and 
 
 208. Such issues even appeared in debates leading up to the Bayh-Dole Act, when critics 
warned that increasing commercialization at universities would erode scientific norms. Argyres 
& Liebeskind, supra note 192, at 435–36. 
 209. Etzkowitz, supra note 23, at 26; see Merges, supra note 7, at 146; Rai, supra note 7, at 
109. 
 210. See Sampat, supra note 31, at 780–81.  
 211. Etzkowitz, supra note 23, at 27; see BOK, supra note 28, at 3. 
 212. Henry Etzkowitz & Andrew Webster, Science as Intellectual Property, in HANDBOOK 
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 480, 480–81 (Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James 
C. Petersen & Trevor Pinch eds., 1995); see Rowe, supra note 137, at 923.  
 213. See supra notes 38–39. 
 214. See BOK, supra note 28, at 140; NORBERT WIENER, INVENTION: THE CARE AND 
FEEDING OF IDEAS 151 (1993); Lee, supra note 16, at 861; Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. 
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particular universities and scientists differ in their attitudes toward 
patenting and commercialization.215 Fourth, in some contexts, 
traditional sharing and public interest norms have not been displaced, 
but have been subtly adapted to a new default environment that 
favors exclusive rights.216 
Notwithstanding these caveats, as a general matter, academic 
institutions and individuals have become much more commercially 
oriented.217 Prior to 1980, few universities systematically reviewed 
laboratory work to find discoveries ripe for practical application.218 
The Bayh-Dole Act helped change this state of affairs and 
encouraged universities to act more like commercial entities.219 
According to one commentator, “Universities have evolved from 
public trusts into something closer to venture capital firms.”220 In the 
formerly financially disinterested realm of academia, some scientists 
have become jealous of colleagues who have translated academic 
discoveries into personal wealth, a phenomenon known as the 
“Porsche principle.”221 At the personal level, embracing 
commercialization has posed challenges for scientists steeped in 
Mertonian “role identities.”222 Some scientists delegate 
 
Powell, Networks and Institutions, in SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 596, 613–14 (Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin & Roy 
Suddaby eds., 2008); Siegel et al., supra note 5, at 121; Liza Vertinsky, An Organizational 
Approach to the Design of Patent Law, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 211, 244 (2012). 
 215. Sobolski et al., supra note 207, at 3138; see Maryann P. Feldman & Pierre Desrochers, 
Truth for Its Own Sake: Academic Culture and Technology Transfer at Johns Hopkins 
University, 42 MINERVA 105, 107 (2004) (describing how Johns Hopkins University, a major 
recipient of research funds, has traditionally been skeptical of patenting and licensing). 
 216. See generally Peter Lee, Interface: The Push and Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2225 (2009); Merges, supra note 7. 
 217. See, e.g., Karen Seashore Louis, David Blumenthal, Michael E. Gluck & Michael A. 
Stoto, Entrepreneurs in Academe: An Exploration of Behaviors Among Life Scientists, 34 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 110, 110 (1989).  
 218. BOK, supra note 28, at 28. 
 219. Cf. Colyvas et al., supra note 21, at 62 (noting that the Bayh-Dole Act encouraged 
universities to advertise inventions to industry). 
 220. Clifton Leaf, The Law of Unintended Consequences, FORTUNE, Sept. 19, 2005, at 252. 
 221. Bob Tedeschi, The Idea Incubator Goes to Campus, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at BU1. 
 222. See generally Sanjay Jain, Gerald George & Mark Maltarich, Academics or 
Entrepreneurs? Investigating Role Identity Modification of University Scientists Involved in 
Commercialization Activity, 38 RES. POL’Y 922 (2009). Interestingly, researchers have found a 
gender gap in scientists’ tendency to engage in patenting and commercial activities. See, e.g., 
Waverly W. Ding, Fiona Murray & Toby E. Stuart, From Bench to Board: Gender Differences in 
University Scientists’ Participation in Corporate Scientific Advisory Boards, ACAD. MGMT. J. 
(forthcoming), available at http://amj.aom.org/content/early/2012/10/09/amj.2011.0020; Waverly 
W. Ding, Fiona Murray & Toby E. Stuart, Gender Differences in Patenting in the Academic Life 
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commercialization functions to other entities (such as graduate 
students) and create “buffers” by establishing clear work priorities 
and reaffirming their commitment to nonprofit science in order to 
distance themselves from business activities.223 Interestingly, these 
strategies parallel earlier institutional segregation within universities 
that allowed them to retain their academic identities while delegating 
patent management to independent entities. 
Again, the emergence of biotechnology illustrates the evolution 
of academic norms. Cohen and Boyer initially resisted patenting their 
discovery of recombinant DNA technology, with Cohen being the 
primary holdout.224 He relented, however, upon the persuasion of 
Niels Reimers, head of Stanford’s Office of Technology Licensing.225 
Notably, Cohen told Reimers that he would renounce any future 
royalties arising from a patent.226 The scientists assigned the patent to 
Stanford and UCSF, and it has gone on to become the most profitable 
patent in both schools’ histories.227 By 1996, it had generated over 
$150 million in royalties. Also emblematic of the times, Cohen and 
Boyer’s involvement in commercialization extended well beyond 
filing patent applications. Boyer and venture capitalist Robert 
Swanson founded Genentech,228 a pioneer in the biotech industry, and 
Cohen joined the scientific advisory board of Cetus, another 
important early biotech company. In general, university scientists 
have played formative roles in many leading biotech firms.229 With 
patents as an important catalyst, academic scientists and universities 
have become increasingly integrated in the commercial exploitation 
of science. 
2. Changes in Patent Policy.  Universities’ growing openness to 
commercial imperatives is reflected in changes to patent policy. As in 
earlier times, official patent policies emphasize universities’ use of 
 
Sciences, 313 SCIENCE 665, 665 (2006) (finding that female faculty scientists patent at about 40 
percent the rate of male faculty scientists). 
 223. Jain et al., supra note 222, at 923. 
 224. Hughes, supra note 53, at 549–52. 
 225. See Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note 12, at 264. 
 226. Hughes, supra note 53, at 550. 
 227. BOK, supra note 28, at 140; KENNEY, supra note 58, at 23. 
 228. Jeannette Colyvas, Annetine Gelijns & Nathan Rosenberg, Intellectual Property Rights 
and Academic Health Centers, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEKING 
STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING IN A DEVELOPING FIELD 155, 160 (Ove 
Granstand ed., 2003). 
 229. BOK, supra note 28, at 13.  
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intellectual property to advance the public interest. Asserting 
exclusivity and obtaining revenues, however, are also regarded as 
legitimate functions of technology transfer.230 Furthermore, as noted 
above, Harvard and several other leading research universities 
dropped longstanding policies against patenting biomedical 
discoveries in the 1970s. More broadly, universities have adopted 
policies encouraging commercial activities by faculty members.231 
Further illustrating a notable cultural shift,232 some universities even 
credit patents and commercialization activities in tenure and 
promotion decisions.233 Commercialization and revenue generation 
have become core parts of universities’ institutional missions: former 
Duke University President Terry Sanford once noted that 
‘“universities should do all that is reasonably possible to earn returns 
on inventions, and should not be timid in making prudent business 
arrangements to assure the largest fair return.’”234  
3. Contemporary Patenting Practices.  Contemporary patent 
practice by universities reflects new norms of exclusivity and 
commercialization that would have been unfamiliar in the early 
twentieth century. Case studies reflect a markedly aggressive attitude 
toward obtaining patents, particularly on fundamental discoveries. 
An examination of university patenting, however, reveals a 
complicated normative environment in which universities 
simultaneously seek profits while still serving traditional public 
objectives. 
 
 230. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV., STATEMENT OF POLICY IN REGARD TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (2010), available at http://otd.harvard.edu/resources/policies/IP/IPPolicy.pdf; 
Stanford Univ., Research Policy Handbook: 5.1, DORESEARCH, http://doresearch.stanford.edu/
policies/research-policy-handbook/human-subjects-stem-cells-and-skeletal-remains-research/
human-0 (last visited Aug. 26, 2013). 
 231. See, e.g., UNIV. OF CAL., GUIDELINES ON UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RELATIONS 1 (1989), 
available at http://www.ucop.edu/ott/genresources/policy_pdf/IndRelGuidelines.PDF (“In 
general, faculty members are encouraged to engage in appropriate outside professional 
relationships with private industry.”). 
 232. See Lee, supra note 16, at 848; see also BOK, supra note 28, at 63.  
 233. See Jeannie Baumann, House Innovation Panel Hears Benefits of Bayh-Dole, Advances 
in Tech Transfer, 84 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 344 (2012) (noting that the Board of 
Regents of the University System of Maryland has modified tenure criteria to consider 
commercialization activities). 
 234. Terry Sanford, The University and Technology: New Paths and New Perspectives, in 1 
THE LAW OF BUSINESS AND LICENSING: LICENSING IN THE 1980S 1-63, 1-67 (Robert 
Goldscheider and Tom Arnold eds., 1989). 
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Returning to a familiar player, WARF has attracted significant 
criticism for its patents on isolated human embryonic stem cells 
(hESCs). In the late 1990s, James Thomson of the University of 
Wisconsin obtained three patents on isolated hESCs and assigned 
them to WARF.235 These cells have the capacity to develop into 
almost all kinds of human tissue and thereby represent both 
fundamental research tools as well as promising platforms for future 
therapies. The patents “cede a remarkable amount of territory to 
WARF,”236 and commentators have warned that they may inhibit 
basic research and product development.237 WARF has actively 
promoted commercialization of these cells: in exchange for $1 million 
of sponsored research, it exclusively licensed six important cell types 
that can be derived from these cell lines to Geron, a private firm.238 
WARF has, however, made efforts to enhance access to these 
patented cells for nonprofit research. Due in part to public pressure, 
WARF and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) negotiated a deal 
by which federally funded scientists can utilize WARF cells for 
research purposes, though the deal strictly restricts commercial 
applications.239 WARF’s stem cell patents have attracted significant 
criticism within the academic community and were the target of a 
successful reexamination challenge, which ultimately invalidated one 
of the patents and cast doubt on the others.240 
Perhaps even more controversial has been Columbia University’s 
attempt to extend patent exclusivity on cotransformation.241 In the late 
 
 235. U.S. Patent No. 6,280,718 (filed Nov. 8, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26, 
1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996). 
 236. Christopher D. Hazuka, Supporting the Work of Lesser Geniuses: An Argument for 
Removing Obstructions to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 174 
(2002). 
 237. See Lee, supra note 110, at 85–86 (noting such warnings). 
 238. See Mueller, supra note 137, at 14; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole 
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 301 (2003). 
 239. Lee, supra note 110, at 927. 
 240. See John Conley, Allison Williams Dobson & Dan Vorhaus, WARF Reexamination 
Takes Another Bite out of Biotech Patents, GENOMICS L. REP. (May 19, 2010), http://www.
genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/05/19/warf-biotech-patents; Alla Katsnelson, Stem Cell 
Patent Battle Continues, NEWSBLOG (May 3, 2012, 8:26 PM BST), http://blogs.nature.com/news/
2010/05/stem_cell_patent_battle_contin_1.html. 
 241. See Editorial, Ownership at Too High a Price?, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 953, 953 (2003); 
Ken Howard, Biotechs Sue Columbia over Fourth Axel Patent, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 955, 955 
(2003); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 
43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1417–18 (2007); Bernard Wysocki Jr., Columbia’s Pursuit of Patent 
Riches Angers Companies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2004, at A1. 
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1970s, neuroscientist Richard Axel and his colleagues at Columbia 
patented cotransformation, a process for inserting exogenous DNA 
into a host cell to produce particular proteins. They filed for a patent 
in 1980, prior to the effective date of the Bayh-Dole Act.242 According 
to pre-Act rules, NIH (which helped fund the research) allowed 
Columbia to take title to the patent, but it cautioned the university 
against engaging in repressive licensing practices.243 Columbia’s 
cotransformation patent has been highly lucrative, with several firms 
paying over $300 million in combined licensing fees.244 When the 
patent expired, Columbia announced that it had secured another 
patent in 2002—which expires in 2019—that also covers 
cotransformation technology.245 Several former licensees sued to 
declare Columbia’s patent invalid and unenforceable,246 and Columbia 
received significant criticism for its attempts to extend exclusivity 
over this foundational research process. 
Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical 
Research have also received criticism for patenting a fundamental 
biological process. In 2002, these academic institutions obtained a 
broad patent on a basic biochemical pathway known as the NF-kB 
cell-signaling pathway,247 which has been linked to a wide range of 
diseases including cancer, osteoporosis, atherosclerosis, and 
rheumatoid arthritis. The institutions exclusively licensed the patent 
to Ariad Pharmaceuticals and joined with Ariad in suing several 
pharmaceutical firms for infringement.248 Observers have criticized the 
breadth of the NF-kB patent as well as the universities’ licensing 
practices and decision to sue firms that are successfully 
commercializing technologies related to it.249 
Finally, the story of Myriad Genetics has become emblematic to 
many of the excesses of contemporary patenting. In the 1990s, 
University of Utah researcher Mark Skolnick led a team that 
sequenced BRCA1 and BRCA2, two genes related to breast and 
 
 242. Leaf, supra note 220, at 261. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Editorial, supra note 241, at 953. 
 245. Leaf, supra note 220, at 261. 
 246. See In re Columbia Univ. Patent Litig., 343 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass. 2004); Biogen Idec 
MA Inc. v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 332 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 247. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 238, at 302. 
 248. See infra notes 357–61. 
 249. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 238, at 302. 
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ovarian cancer.250 Shortly thereafter, the University of Utah and 
Myriad Genetics, a biotechnology firm cofounded by Skolnick, 
obtained several patents on these genes.251 Myriad Genetics has 
received significant criticism for asserting its patents against medical 
providers seeking to perform diagnostic tests involving BRCA1 and 
BRCA2.252 In particular, public health and women’s advocates have 
alleged that Myriad’s patents have raised the price and decreased the 
availability of diagnostic testing. In 2009, various plaintiffs 
represented by the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit 
challenging the validity of Myriad’s patents on patentable subject 
matter grounds. The case has attracted enormous attention as it has 
worked its way up the federal courts, and the Supreme Court recently 
invalidated Myriad’s patent claims covering isolated DNA.253 
Further reflecting their aggressive patent practices, 
contemporary universities have become active participants in 
litigation.254 Empirical work by Professor Christopher Holman found 
that from 2000 to 2009, there were 139 cases in which a university 
joined a licensee in suing another party for patent infringement and 
51 cases in which universities brought patent infringement suits on 
their own.255 Follow-up work by Professor Jacob Rooksby found that 
between January 1, 2009, and December 31, 2010, 33 universities had 
filed 57 separate patent infringement suits, often in conjunction with a 
licensee.256 The University of California,257 the University of 
 
 250. Robert Dalpé, Louise Bouchard, Anne-Julie Houle & Louis Bédard, Watching the 
Race To Find the Breast Cancer Genes, 28 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 187, 195–99 (2003); 
Leaf, supra note 220, at 266. 
 251. Dalpé et al., supra note 250, at 195, 199; see Leaf, supra note 220, at 266. Interestingly, 
an inventorship dispute with NIH was resolved when the University of Utah and Myriad agreed 
to add certain NIH researchers to a patent application and share royalties with NIH. Dalpé et 
al., supra note 250, at 196. 
 252. See, e.g., Subhashini Chandrasekharan & Robert Cook-Deegan, Commentary, Gene 
Patents and Personalized Medicine—What Lies Ahead?, 1 GENOME MED. 92.1, 92.1 (2009). 
 253. See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116–18 
(2013). 
 254. See Bagley, supra note 37, at 219 n.8; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Data-Sharing 
in Public Science, 15 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1013, 1016–18 (2006); Arti K. Rai, John R. 
Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First 
Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1552–55 (2009); Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and 
Litigation: Tensions Between Universities and Patents and How To Fix Them, 15 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 312, 338–40 (2013); Rowe, supra note 137, at 936–37. 
 255. Christopher M. Holman, Professor, UMKC School of Law, Presentation at Santa Clara 
School of Law Symposium: University Patent Litigation (Jan. 30, 2009) (presentation slides on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 256. Rooksby, supra note 254, at 330. 
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Colorado,258 Cornell,259 Columbia,260 Harvard,261 MIT,262 the University 
of Minnesota,263 and the University of Rochester264 have all been 
involved in high-profile cases. Such litigation reveals a much more 
aggressive, commercially oriented academic culture than in past eras. 
Among other effects, such litigation has complicated universities’ 
relationships with various stakeholders.265 The political influence of a 
prospective defendant may influence a university’s decision whether 
to pursue litigation, particularly for public institutions.266 And in one 
notable case, Micron responded to a patent infringement lawsuit by 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign by announcing that it 
would no longer recruit any students from that university.267 
Not surprisingly, universities have attracted criticism for 
exploiting patent litigation for financial gain. For example, in Eolas 
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,268 the University of California 
licensed a patent to a firm that is essentially a nonpracticing entity 
(NPE),269 then sought to share a jury award of $520.6 million against 
Microsoft before ultimately obtaining $30.4 million when the case 
 
 257. See, e.g., Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 258. See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (involving Competitive Technologies, Inc., which represents the University of 
Colorado and Cornell University). 
 259. Id. In a separate suit against Hewlett-Packard, Cornell obtained a jury verdict of $184 
million in damages, which was later reduced to $71.3 million before the parties settled. Susan 
Kelley, Hewlett-Packard, Cornell Reach Settlement in Patent Case, CORNELL CHRON. ONLINE 
(June 9, 2012), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June10/HPCaseClosed.html. 
 260. In re Columbia Univ. Patent Litig., 343 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 261. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 262. Id. at 1336; Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Lockheed Martin Global Telecomms., Inc., 251 F. 
Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Mass. 2003); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Speedera Networks, Inc., No. CIV.A.02-
10188-RWZ, 2002 WL 1969657 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2002). 
 263. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (D. Minn. 
1999); see Rowe, supra note 137, at 937 (noting that the litigation led to a $300 million 
settlement for the University of Minnesota). 
 264. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 265. See Nelson, supra note 189, at 17 (noting tensions between companies supporting 
academic research and universities claiming and asserting patent rights). 
 266. See Rooksby, supra note 254, at 347. 
 267. Dennis Crouch, Although “Without Tact,” Micron’s Retaliatory Decision To Stop 
Hiring University of Illinois Graduates is Not Illegal, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.
patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/although-without-tact-microns-retaliatory-decision-to-stop-hiring-
university-of-illinois-graduates-is-not-illegal.html. 
 268. Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 269. NPEs, also referred to as patent trolls, are entities that hold patents but do not produce 
any goods or services, relying on licensing fees and the threat of litigation for revenue. 
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settled.270 Commenting on the case, a representative of the University 
of California simply stated, “The University expects to be fairly 
compensated for use of its patented technology.”271 These and other 
activities have led patent scholars to question whether universities are 
patent trolls.272 Indeed, nearly fifty universities have contractual 
arrangements with Intellectual Ventures, one of the earliest and most 
prominent NPEs.273 
Turning to licensing practices, an NIH study “concluded that 
universities have sought just about every kind of clause in research 
tool licenses to which they themselves have objected, including 
publication restrictions, rights in or the option to license future 
discoveries, and prohibition on transfer to other institutions or 
scientists.”274 As a general matter, Professor Mark Lemley identifies 
“a felt sense among a lot of people that universities are not good 
actors in the patent system.”275 
The normative landscape of university patenting, however, is 
quite complicated. Though universities have certainly become more 
aggressive in obtaining and asserting patents, particularly on 
“foundational” resources, vestiges of academic norms persist. Some 
technology transfer offices (TTOs) decline to patent fundamental 
research tools precisely to facilitate their wide availability to the 
 
 270. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 611, 618 (2008). The University of California stood to receive 25 percent of the 
proceeds from the verdict. Michael Kanellos & Jim Hu, Microsoft Ordered To Pay $521 million, 
CNET (Aug. 11, 2003 5:29 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1012-5062409.html; see Todd Bishop, 
Microsoft’s Eolas Settlement: UC Gets $30.4m, MICROSOFT BLOG (Oct. 10, 2007 5:02 PM), 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2007/10/10/microsofts-eolas-settlement-uc-gets-30-4m. 
 271. See Questions and Answers About UC/Eolas Patent Infringement Suit Against 
Microsoft, U. CAL., http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/article/9812 (last visited Aug. 26, 
2013). 
 272. Lemley, supra note 270, at 618; see Rai et al., supra note 254, at 1522–23 (“Additionally, 
because universities, and sometimes even their exclusive licensees, are nonmanufacturing 
patentees, the intense debate over whether such patentees employ ‘holdup’ strategies 
deleterious to innovation when they assert patents against successful commercializers directly 
implicates universities.”). 
 273. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 8, 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf. 
 274. Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler, Addressing 
Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1081 (2005) (citing NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4, 
1998), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/research/fed/NIH/researchtools/Report98.htm). 
 275. Lemley, supra note 270, at 619. 
LEE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:47 PM 
2013] PATENTS AND THE UNIVERSITY 45 
scientific community.276 At the enforcement level, universities holding 
patents often assert far less than their full exclusionary force.277 And 
although universities have been involved in high-profile litigation 
against companies, they have generally not sued other universities.278 
Furthermore, in the licensing realm, universities are utilizing 
their patents in somewhat publicly spirited ways to advance 
noncommercial research and distributive objectives.279 As I have 
described elsewhere, many TTOs retain research exemptions when 
licensing their technology to others.280 That is, even when a university 
exclusively licenses a technology to a private firm, it will retain the 
right to utilize this invention for nonprofit research and to grant 
licenses to other nonprofit research institutions to do the same.281 In 
this manner, universities are creating a contractual experimental use 
exception by embedding research safe harbors in patent licenses.282 
Additionally, some universities have expanded access to patented 
technologies—particularly health-related technologies—for low-
income populations.283 One example involves Yale University’s 
renegotiation of its exclusive license for a patented anti-AIDS 
medication to allow for lower prices in South Africa.284 Furthermore, 
universities are increasingly including humanitarian provisions in 
licenses to enhance access to patented health technologies for 
vulnerable populations.285 Several years ago, Stanford University 
convened an influential working group of leading TTOs to identify 
 
 276. See Rai, supra note 7, at 112 (noting that Harvard and Stanford do not file patent 
applications on expressed sequence tags (ESTs)). 
 277. Merges, supra note 7, at 150. 
 278. They have, however, been involved in interferences. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of 
Calif. v. Univ. of Iowa Res. Found., 455 F.3d 1371, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 279. Peter Lee, Contracting To Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in 
Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 944–46 (2009). 
 280. Id. at 945; see Lori Pressman, Richard Burgess, Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Stephen J. 
McCormack, Io Nami-Wolk, Melissa Soucy & LeRoy Walters, The Licensing of DNA Patents 
by Large US Academic Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31, 35 (2009) 
(“The 19 respondent academic institutions retain research-use rights themselves and insist on 
the right to transfer these research-use rights to other nonprofit institutions.”). 
 281. See, e.g., Licensing Harvard Patent Rights: A Guideline to the Essentials of Harvard’s 
License Agreements, HARVARD U. OFF. TECH. DEV., http://www.techtransfer.harvard.edu/
resources/guidelines/license (last visited Aug. 26, 2013); Exclusive Agreement, ¶ 3.4, available at 
http://otl.stanford.edu/documents/revstdagmt.pdf (last visited July 30, 2013). 
 282. Lee, supra note 279, at 946. 
 283. Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 978. 
 284. Id. at 980; see Kapczynski et al., supra note 274, at 1034–37. 
 285. Lee, supra note 283, at 981–82. 
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various licensing best practices, such as research and humanitarian 
exceptions.286 While university patenting is much more explicitly 
commercial than in past generations, universities are conscientiously 
using patents to “push” certain noncommercial, academic norms into 
the marketplace.287 
Ironically, these progressive licensing practices, which advance 
noncommercial values, are helping to drag universities deeper into 
patent litigation. Under U.S. patent law, ordinarily only a party 
holding legal title to a patent may sue for infringement.288 In some 
cases, exclusive licensees may hold sufficient rights in a patent to 
allow them to bring suit without joining the original patentee. 
However, when a licensor, such as a university, retains substantial 
rights in an invention, it may be required to join litigation before a 
licensee can bring an enforcement action.289 This was the case in 
AsymmetRx v. Biocare Medical, LLC,290 in which the Federal Circuit 
held that AsymmetRx, which had licensed patents from Harvard 
University, did not have standing to bring an infringement suit 
without Harvard’s participation.291 In its licenses, Harvard had 
retained the right to use the subject inventions for noncommercial 
research as well as the right to grant additional licenses if 
AsymmetRx failed to meet various commercialization milestones.292 
The court held that because of these retained rights, AsymmetRx 
could only bring an infringement suit if Harvard joined as a plaintiff. 
Tellingly, the court acknowledged the public-interest objectives of 
Harvard’s retained rights, noting that these license provisions “may 
also reflect the perceived needs of a university attempting to balance 
the public interest with commercializing the results of its professors’ 
research.”293 Nonetheless, these retained rights have the effect of 
further pushing universities to participate in patent litigation. 
 
 286. CAL INST. OF TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN 
LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 8–9 (2007), available at http://news-service.stanford.edu/
news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf. 
 287. See Lee, supra note 216, at 2229. See generally Lee, supra note 283. 
 288. See Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 289. Id. at 1131. See generally Rooksby, supra note 254.  
 290. AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 291. See id. at 1322 (“We thus conclude that Harvard did not convey all substantial rights 
under the ’256 and ’227 patents to AsymmetRx in the AsymmetRx License, and, as a result, 
AsymmetRx lacks statutory standing, on its own, to bring an infringement suit against 
Biocare.”). 
 292. Id. at 1316. 
 293. Id. at 1321. 
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4. Shifts in Institutional Structure.  Whereas early forays into 
patenting were marked by institutional segregation of academic and 
patenting functions, the guiding theme in recent times is integration.294 
To begin, universities’ embrace of patenting has resulted in significant 
infrastructure building, most notably the establishment of hundreds 
of TTOs on university campuses.295 Unlike earlier eras when 
universities sought to distance themselves from actively managing 
patents and licenses, these days, university officials are directly 
involved in such activities.296 
Furthermore, patents and commercialization have fostered a 
wealth of connections between university and industry. The Bayh-
Dole Act “revolutionized” university-industry relations;297 one 1996 
survey found that “over 90 percent of life-science companies in the 
United States had some relationship with academia.”298 Oftentimes, 
commercial firms sponsor research at universities in exchange for 
exclusive licenses or options on any resulting patented inventions. 
Reflecting more aggressive institution building, entities such as the 
Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research at MIT reflect “an 
attempt to create an inter-penetrating system of public and private 
research within a university setting.”299 Furthermore, universities have 
created “proof of concept centers” to help bridge the gap between 
research outputs and commercial products.300 Indeed, convergence in 
the organization of academic and industrial research has led to 
“exchange of personnel, common research projects and, in some 
cases, large-scale joint ventures.”301 The trend of universities taking 
equity stakes in companies that license their patents further reflects 
 
 294. Cf. Etzkowitz, supra note 41, at 416. 
 295. See Nelson, supra note 189, at 13. 
 296. See Etzkowitz, supra note 41, at 420; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 811. 
 297. Press & Washburn, supra note 12, at 41; see Etzkowitz, supra note 41, at 416. Ironically, 
companies have at times opposed university patenting and the sharp business practices of 
university licensors. See id. at 395–96. 
 298. David Blumenthal, Nancyanne Causino, Eric Campbell & Karen Seashore Louis, 
Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences—An Industry 
Survey, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 369 (1996). 
 299. Argyres & Liebeskind, supra note 192, at 448; see Stephen Heuser, Harvard Woos 
Firms To Fund Research, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2005, at 1 (describing Harvard University’s 
aggressive campaign to increase sponsored research). 
 300. See EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., PROOF OF CONCEPT CENTERS: 
ACCELERATING THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF UNIVERSITY INNOVATION 2 (2008), available at 
http://sites.kauffman.org/pdf/POC_Centers_01242008.pdf. 
 301. Louis et al., supra note 217, at 114. 
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the theme of academic-commercial integration.302 In some instances, 
these ties linking faculty inventors, universities, and licensee firms 
approach vertical integration of universities and commercial 
partners.303 
Indeed, patent-mediated technology transfer necessarily involves 
a high degree of personal contact between faculty inventors and 
licensees.304 The need to transfer patent-related “tacit knowledge,” for 
example, helps explain the important role of star academic scientists 
in founding and leading new biotechnology firms (many of which 
license university patents).305 Moving beyond personal connections, 
the very cultures of academia and industry are beginning to converge. 
Research scientists move frequently between universities and 
industry, faculty members take sabbaticals at companies, and 
biotechnology firms mimic academic culture by creating postdoctoral 
fellowships.306 Although not all of these trends are attributable to 
patenting per se, the profusion of patents has been part and parcel of 
a general cultural convergence of academia and industry. 
* * * 
As reflected in norms, policy, and practice, universities and their 
scientists have become much more receptive to patenting and 
commercialization relative to the pre-Bayh-Dole Act era. Norms of 
open science have eroded,307 universities have routinely patented 
foundational research tools and engaged in litigation, and 
institutional connections between universities and industry have 
 
 302. Maryann Feldman, Irwin Feller, Janet Bercovitz & Richard Burton, Equity and the 
Technology Transfer Strategies of American Research Universities, 48 MGMT. SCI. 105, 105 
(2002). 
 303. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and 
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1556–57 (2012); cf. 
Edwin Mansfield, Academic Research Underlying Industrial Innovations: Sources, 
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 304. Lee, supra note 303, at 1527–28. 
 305. Lynne G. Zucker, Michael R. Darby & Marilynn B. Brewer, Intellectual Human Capital 
and the Birth of U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 290, 302 (1998); Lynne G. 
Zucker & Michael R. Darby, Star Scientists and Institutional Transformation: Patterns of 
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ACAD. SCI. 12,709, 12,710 (1996). 
 306. Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note 12, at 263.  
 307. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 238, at 310. 
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deepened. Although vestiges of academic and public-interest norms 
remain,308 the baseline has changed as universities have become 
“active participants in the business of science.”309 In addition to 
important substantive changes, universities have also undergone an 
important evolution in how they are perceived by the outside public. 
Universities have long played a rhetorically important role in society 
as vanguards of disinterested academic inquiry. However, “[a]s 
universities become more identified with commercial wealth, they 
also lose their uniqueness in society.”310 Indeed, universities’ embrace 
of patenting and commercial ventures has been reflected in patent 
doctrine, helping to define a new equilibrium between patents and 
the university.311 
B. Patent Law Viewing Academic Science: Doctrinal Internalization 
and the Demise of Exceptionalism 
Just as academic science has internalized patents, patent doctrine 
has internalized academic science. Academic inventions, inventors, 
and practices are now frequent subjects of patent doctrine. 
Furthermore, courts increasingly view universities as integrated into 
the mainstream commercial narrative of the patent system. Since 
1980—the year of the Bayh-Dole Act—courts in patent cases have 
consistently rejected distinctions between universities and other, 
typically commercial, actors. Importantly, the evolving normative 
status of universities has played a significant role in the erosion of 
academic exceptionalism. Whereas uniquely academic norms, 
practices, and policies helped justify exceptional treatment of 
universities in earlier generations, modern courts view universities as 
much more akin to commercial entities and treat them accordingly. 
1. Eroding Doctrinal Hedges.  As mentioned above, patent 
doctrine itself has played a key role in erasing distinctions between 
 
 308. See supra notes 276–87 and accompanying text. 
 309. Gary P. Pisano, Can Science Be a Business? Lessons from Biotech, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Oct. 2006, at 114, 116; see KENNEY, supra note 58, at 246; Janet Rae-Dupree, When Academia 
Puts Profit Ahead of Wonder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at BU4.  
 310. Phillip A. Sharp, The Biomedical Sciences in Context, in THE FRAGILE CONTRACT: 
UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 146, 148 (David H. Guston & 
Kenneth Keniston eds., 1994). 
 311. See Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 464–65 (“[U]niversities have begun to reach further 
upstream for patents and to take a harder line on licensing, which makes them look even more 
commercial—and even less sympathetic to the Federal Circuit.”). 
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academic science and other types of technological work and bringing 
universities into the patent fold. In particular, the Supreme Court’s 
1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty marks a turning point in 
relations between patents and the university. Although Chakrabarty 
did not deal with an academic invention, its holding that genetically 
modified living organisms comprise patentable subject matter,312 and 
its generally expansive approach to patent eligibility, significantly 
impacted universities. Notably, the University of California as well as 
a consortium of academic scientists and institutions had submitted 
amicus briefs arguing in favor of patentability and stressing the 
importance of patents in commercializing academic inventions.313 
Among other effects, Chakrabarty helped “galvaniz[e] the rush into 
biotechnology.”314 Its famous (though, perhaps flawed315) articulation 
of patentable subject matter as covering “‘anything under the sun that 
is made by man’” encompassed many university discoveries in fields 
as diverse as biotechnology and computer science.316 Other patentable 
subject matter decisions establishing the patent eligibility of software-
related inventions317 and plants318 further widened the door for 
university patents. 
In addition, case law of the Federal Circuit also helped usher 
universities into the patent system. In earlier eras, the doctrine of 
utility had operated as a significant bulwark separating upstream, 
embryonic academic discoveries from patentable technologies.319 In In 
re Brana,320 however, the Federal Circuit held that compounds 
showing therapeutic effects in artificial, nonhuman “tumor models” 
satisfied the utility requirement,321 thus widening the door for 
patenting upstream biomedical inventions quite removed from 
human application. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit adopted a 
rather lax approach to the nonobviousness requirement for DNA 
inventions, holding that a claimed DNA may be nonobvious even 
 
 312. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
 313. Kevles, supra note 41, at 302–03. 
 314. KENNEY, supra note 58, at 190. 
 315. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3248–49 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 316. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).  
 317. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1980). 
 318. Ex parte Hibberd, No. 645-91, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 443 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 18, 1985).  
 319. See supra notes 128–35 and accompanying text. 
 320. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 321. Id. at 1565. 
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when the protein that it codes for as well as methods of gene cloning 
are in the prior art.322 Such doctrine further facilitated patenting the 
fruits of biotechnology, a particularly active area of university 
research. These doctrinal developments have played a key role in 
further integrating university discoveries within the patent system.323 
As universities entered the patent system en masse, the question 
arose as to whether patent doctrine should treat them differently than 
other actors, as it did in certain contexts in earlier times. Not 
surprisingly, universities have often argued for preferential treatment 
within the patent system, sometimes based on the perceived policy 
goals of the Act. Contemporary courts, however, have routinely 
rejected academic exceptionalism. Part of this development merely 
reflects courts’ rejection of overreaching arguments from a new class 
of university litigants. But it also reflects courts’ recognition (and 
reinforcement) of changing academic norms and the integration of 
universities into the traditional commercial narrative of patents.324  
2. Rejecting Academic Exceptionalism. 
a. Priority.  For example, the Federal Circuit has refused to 
extend special treatment to university researchers in the context of 
determining priority of invention. In the 1987 case of Griffith v. 
Kanamaru,325 the court considered a priority dispute between Griffith, 
an associate professor at Cornell University Medical College, and 
Kanamaru, an employee of Takeda Chemical Industries.326 Both 
 
 322. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New 
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 833 (1999). 
 323. In many respects, the treatment of university science in the patent system follows 
broader structural trends, such as the Federal Circuit’s early enthusiasm for patents. This 
remains true of more recent trends, such as the recent narrowing of patentability in Federal 
Circuit and Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
 324. This commercial characterization has also arisen in determining whether public 
universities can enjoy sovereign immunity from patent suits. See Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is also a factor to be considered that 
the university’s [technology transfer] actions are not at the core of the educational/research 
purposes for which the university was chartered as an arm of the state . . . .”). In other contexts 
as well, contemporary courts have been reluctant to extend any exceptional treatment to 
universities, which are increasingly seen as typical commercial actors. Cf. United States v. 
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting any exemption of universities from 
substantive antitrust scrutiny in the context of collusively determining financial aid); Madison et 
al., supra note 31, at 395–96 (discussing the antitrust litigation against universities). 
 325. Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 326. Id. at 625. 
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parties claimed to have been the first inventor of the technology at 
issue. The key question was whether Griffith, who had conceived of 
the invention first, had been “diligent” over an appropriate period of 
time before reducing the invention to practice.327 Griffith justified his 
delay by claiming that he needed to obtain additional research funds 
as well as wait to employ a particular graduate student.328 In doing so, 
he implicitly argued that the particularities of university research 
warranted relaxed application of the diligence requirement. As 
interpreted by the court, Griffith’s arguments “suggest[ed] that, as a 
policy matter, universities should not be treated as businesses, which 
ultimately would detract from scholarly inquiry.”329 The Federal 
Circuit, however, rejected this argument and refused to draw 
distinctions between academic and commercial enterprises. It held 
that Griffith had not been diligent in reducing the invention to 
practice and that he could not claim priority.330 
The opinion took the unusual step of commenting on an article 
by Derek Bok, former president of Harvard University, upon which 
Griffith had relied in his arguments. Contrary to Griffith’s 
interpretation, the Federal Circuit observed that “Bok does not ask 
that the patent laws or other intellectual property law be skewed or 
slanted to enable the university to have its cake and eat it too, i.e., to 
act in a noncommercial manner and yet preserve the pecuniary 
rewards of commercial exploitation for itself.”331 The court’s implicit 
message was that if universities avail themselves of the benefits of the 
patent system, then they will be held to the same standards as any 
other entity. Indeed, in applying strict standards of diligence to 
universities, the court acknowledged that it might encourage 
 
 327. Id. at 626. Conception refers to the mental aspects of invention. See Technitrol, Inc. v. 
United States, 440 F.2d 1362, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Reduction to practice refers to the physical 
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Dynamic Scis. Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1991). These 
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to practice. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. 
L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011). 
 328. Griffith, 816 F.2d at 626. 
 329. Id. at 627. 
 330. Id. at 629. 
 331. Id. at 628. 
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university scientists to act more like commercial actors in prioritizing 
certain lines of research at the expense of others.332 
b. Statutory Bars.  The Federal Circuit’s reluctance to make 
exceptions for university research even extends to an activity that 
rests at the heart of academia: scientific presentations.333 In In re 
Klopfenstein,334 the Federal Circuit considered whether a scientist’s 
presentations at two academic meetings constituted “printed 
publications” that would statutorily bar a later filed patent 
application.335 These presentations were comprised of oral 
commentary as well as slides pasted onto poster board that were 
displayed for at most two-and-a-half days.336 Considering multiple 
factors,337 the court held that the slides constituted printed 
publications that statutorily barred Klopfenstein’s patent.338 The court 
did, however, exhibit some sensitivity to the unique norms of 
academic presentations. It noted, for example, that an entirely oral 
presentation would not constitute a printed publication and that a 
transient display of slides on a screen would not necessarily constitute 
a printed publication.339 Furthermore, the opinion stated, “Where 
professional and behavioral norms entitle a party to a reasonable 
expectation that the information displayed will not be copied, we are 
more reluctant to find something a ‘printed publication.’ This 
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After Klopfenstein: Has the Federal Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About 
Science?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 493, 509 (2007). 
 336. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1347. 
 337. These factors included “the length of time the display was exhibited, the expertise of 
the target audience, the existence (or lack thereof) of reasonable expectations that the material 
displayed would not be copied, and the simplicity or ease with which the material displayed 
could have been copied.” Id. at 1350. 
 338. Id. at 1352. 
 339. Id. at 1349 n.4. 
LEE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:47 PM 
54 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1 
reluctance helps preserve the incentive for inventors to participate in 
academic presentations or discussions.”340 Nonetheless, Klopfenstein’s 
temporary poster displays statutorily barred the patent. 
Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s nod to academic norms, 
commentators have warned that the court’s broad conception of 
printed publications may chill academic presentations and force 
scientists to delay sharing research results.341 Noting that “patent rules 
too often are dictating the pace, form, and scope of discourse and 
sometimes even the direction of the research itself,” Professor Margo 
Bagley advocates altering the novelty rules of both U.S. and foreign 
patent systems to better accommodate academic practices.342 Existing 
patent doctrine, however, has been less solicitous of such academic 
exceptionalism, and it continues to exert a constraining effect on 
rapid publication of scientific findings. 
c. The Written Description Requirement.  In a series of cases, the 
Federal Circuit has rejected preferential treatment for university 
inventions in establishing a stringent written description requirement 
for biomedical technologies. Under prevailing law, patent claims must 
correspond to the “written description” of an invention appearing in 
the patent specification.343 In 1997, the Federal Circuit established a 
high bar for the written description requirement for DNA-based 
inventions. In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.,344 the court invalidated several University of California patent 
claims related to genetically engineered plasmids and microorganisms 
that produce insulin.345 Noting that the University of California’s 
patent described complementary DNA (cDNA) that produced rat 
insulin,346 the Federal Circuit invalidated the University of California’s 
broader claims covering cDNA that produced vertebrate and mammal 
 
 340. Id. at 1351; see also Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1333–34 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (citing In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351) (noting that academic norms created an 
expectation of confidentiality regarding the review of a scientific manuscript). 
 341. Bagley, supra note 37, at 221. 
 342. Id. at 223–24, 269. 
 343. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 344. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 345. Id. at 1562. 
 346. Complementary DNA is comprised of only the DNA sequences of a gene that actually 
code for a particular protein, with noncoding DNA (introns) removed. See Amgen, Inc. v. 
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207–08 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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insulin. In addition to spurring significant doctrinal controversy,347 
Regents of the University of California is notable for imposing 
constraints on DNA-related inventions, an area of significant 
university patenting. 
In another case involving the written description requirement, 
the Federal Circuit expressly rejected special treatment for university 
inventions. In University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,348 the 
Federal Circuit invalidated Rochester’s patent on COX-2 inhibitors, 
an important class of anti-inflammatory medications, on written 
description grounds.349 Although the patent claimed a process for 
inhibiting COX-2 (an enzyme related to inflammation), it did not 
disclose an actual COX-2 inhibitor that could perform this function.350 
Notably, the court rejected Rochester’s calls to interpret the written 
description requirement leniently for university inventions. 
According to Rochester, an unduly strict written description 
requirement would “vitiate[] universities’ ability to bring pioneering 
innovations to the public,”351 thus undermining the Bayh-Dole Act’s 
objective of commercializing academic inventions.352 The University 
of California and the University of Texas joined this argument as 
amici, asserting that a high written description requirement would 
jeopardize university technology transfer.353 The court, however, 
refused to bend the rules for university inventions. It flatly noted that 
the Act “was not intended to relax the statutory requirements for 
patentability” to benefit university patentees.354 Notwithstanding the 
 
 347. In particular, it sparked a robust debate regarding whether the written description 
requirement should apply to original as well as amended claims (as the Federal Circuit so 
construed) or whether it should only apply to amended claims. See Peter Lee, Antiformalism at 
the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 405, 
420 (2012). 
 348. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 349. Id. at 917. 
 350. Id. at 930. 
 351. Id. at 929. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
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burdens on university patentees,355 the Federal Circuit has insisted on 
a high written description standard for biomedical inventions.356 
The Federal Circuit continued to reject academic exceptionalism 
in a 2010 en banc case, Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.357 As noted, Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute for 
Biomedical Research obtained a broad patent on a basic biochemical 
pathway known as the NF-kB cell-signaling pathway, then exclusively 
licensed it to Ariad.358 Ariad and the universities sued Eli Lilly and 
others for infringement, but a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit 
held that certain claims in Ariad’s patent were invalid for failing the 
written description requirement.359 Upon en banc review, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed, clarifying (against the universities’ arguments) that 
the written description requirement exists as an independent criterion 
of patentability alongside enablement.360 Furthermore, the Federal 
Circuit rejected the patentees’ policy argument that a stringent 
written description requirement would disfavor universities, whose 
scientists often discover upstream, basic inventions for which 
providing an adequate written description is particularly difficult: 
Much university research relates to basic research, including 
research into scientific principles and mechanisms of action, and 
universities may not have the resources or inclination to work out 
the practical implications of all such research, i.e., finding and 
identifying compounds able to affect the mechanism discovered. 
That is no failure of the law’s interpretation, but its intention.361 
Notwithstanding the somewhat unique nature of academic research, 
the Federal Circuit has frequently maintained that it will treat 
university patentees no differently than other players in the patent 
 
 355. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Must a university or small biotech 
company expend scarce resources to produce every potential nucleotide sequence that exhibits 
their inventive functions?”). 
 356. See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1122–28 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (invalidating Carnegie Mellon’s patents on novel recombinant plasmids and related 
inventions on written description grounds). 
 357. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 358. See supra notes 247–49 and accompanying text. 
 359. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d on 
reh’g en banc, 598 F.3d 1336 (2010). 
 360. Ariad Pharms., Inc., 598 F.3d at 1343. 
 361. Id. at 1353 (citation omitted). 
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system regarding the strictures of the written description 
requirement. 
d. The Common Law Experimental Use Exception.  Turning from 
patentability to infringement, a particularly visible example of 
contemporary patent doctrine’s rejection of academic exceptionalism 
is the Federal Circuit’s narrow conception of the experimental use 
exception. As discussed above, courts have traditionally exempted 
noncommercial, experimental uses of patented inventions from 
infringement.362 In at least one case, this exemption appeared to apply 
to university research involving patented inventions.363 Whether or 
not true as a doctrinal matter, many academic scientists believed that 
their noncommercial research qualified as noninfringing experimental 
use. In more recent times, however, courts have articulated a rather 
narrow conception of the exception.364 In 1984, in a case not involving 
academic research, the Federal Circuit characterized the 
experimental use exception as “truly narrow” and cautioned against 
construing it “so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in 
the guise of ‘scientific inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite, 
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.”365 In a 2000 
concurrence, Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit even declared that 
“the Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental 
use excuses for infringement.”366 
This trend came to a head in 2002, when the Federal Circuit 
directly addressed the experimental use exception’s application to 
university research. In Madey v. Duke University,367 the court rejected 
Duke University’s invocation of the experimental use defense in a 
patent infringement suit brought by a former faculty member.368 The 
Federal Circuit noted that Duke’s ongoing research projects involving 
Madey’s patented laser “unmistakably further [Duke’s] legitimate 
business objectives, including educating and enlightening students 
 
 362. See supra notes 137–50 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text. 
 364. See, e.g., Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (holding 
defendant liable for patent infringement even when it used the invention for “testing, 
evaluational, demonstrational or experimental purposes”). 
 365. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 366. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.2d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., 
concurring); see Mueller, supra note 137, at 28–30. 
 367. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 368. Id. at 1362. 
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and faculty participating in these projects.”369 The court’s language is 
striking in highlighting the “business objectives” of a nonprofit 
research university. The opinion further notes that “Duke . . . like 
other major research institutions of higher learning, is not shy in 
pursuing an aggressive patent licensing program from which it derives 
a not insubstantial revenue stream.”370 Indeed, Duke’s status as a 
nonprofit institution was immaterial to resolving this case.371 
Among other implications, Madey is notable for reflecting a new 
normative vision of universities as commercial entities. As Professors 
Michael Madison, Brett Frischmann, and Katherine Strandburg note, 
“Perhaps because of their increasing commercial entanglements, 
universities were no longer seen by the court as inhabiting a 
distinctive, noncommercial realm.”372 The Federal Circuit’s 
conception of the modern research university diverges sharply from 
“Justice Story’s early-19th-century picture of a gentleman scientist 
driven by idle curiosity.”373 In contemporary times, universities have 
“shed their noncommercial innocence to reach deeper into the 
pockets of commercial firms.”374 After Madey, universities and their 
scientists largely lost whatever privileged normative status they may 
have enjoyed,375 particularly their claim to “disinterested stewardship 
of knowledge in the public interest.”376 In the context of infringement, 
universities’ embrace of patenting and commercialization has helped 
courts reject academic exceptionalism. 
e. Remedies.  In addition to the Federal Circuit, other courts—
notably the Supreme Court—have also rejected academic 
exceptionalism. In determining remedies for patent infringement, the 
Supreme Court has recently suggested that universities should be 
treated just like any other actor in the patent system. The Court 
articulated these views in the 2006 case of eBay v. MercExchange,377 
which established a four-factor equitable test to determine the 
 
 369. Id. at 1363. 
 370. Id. at 1362 n.7. 
 371. Rowe, supra note 137, at 931. 
 372. Madison et al., supra note 31, at 395. 
 373. Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1018. 
 374. Id. 
 375. See Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 377 (noting that after the decision in Madey, “no one, 
not even academics, are [sic] above the intellectual property laws”). 
 376. Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1019. 
 377. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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appropriateness of injunctive relief following a finding of patent 
infringement.378 Notably, the Court stated, 
[S]ome patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made 
inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather 
than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring 
their works to market themselves. Such patent holders may be able 
to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for 
categorically denying them the opportunity to do so.379 
Thus, even though universities do not produce any products, they 
may still be eligible to receive injunctions against parties infringing 
their patents.380 Although a per se rule prohibiting injunctions for 
university patentees would have been rather surprising, the Court’s 
lumping together of universities and other inventive entities tends to 
elide any historical distinctiveness of universities in the patent system. 
Indeed, the Court’s statement that university patentees may obtain 
injunctive relief actually facilitates their status as NPEs that has 
attracted so much criticism. 
In applying eBay to academic patentees, lower courts have also 
highlighted the commercial nature of academic institutions. In 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation v. 
Buffalo Technology Inc.,381 the Eastern District of Texas granted a 
permanent injunction to the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation (CSIRO), a nonprofit scientific research 
foundation established by the Australian government, after finding 
that Buffalo Technologies had infringed one of CSIRO’s patents.382 
Though not a university, CSIRO is a nonprofit academic institution,383 
and this decision provides an indication of how courts are likely to 
treat universities under the eBay framework. Applying eBay, the 
 
 378. Id. at 391. 
 379. Id. at 393. 
 380. Not surprisingly, academic representatives argued in congressional testimony that 
universities should be eligible to receive injunctive relief even though universities do not 
manufacture any products. See Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 41–42 (2005) 
[hereinafter Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: Hearing] (statement of Carl 
Gulbrandsen, Exec. Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.). 
 381. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc. (CSIRO), 492 
F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007). 
 382. Id. at 608.  
 383. CSIRO is not a university but is analogous to the United States National Science 
Foundation or NIH. Id.; see Rai et al., supra note 254, at 1559–60. 
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court ruled that CSIRO would be irreparably harmed by Buffalo’s 
continued infringement in the form of delayed funding and lost 
opportunities to advance technological projects.384 The court noted 
that CSIRO faces competitive pressures to obtain resources, ideas, 
and personnel and that infringement of its patent may place CSIRO 
at a competitive disadvantage.385 In ruling that monetary damages 
were inadequate, the court explicitly compared CSIRO to a 
commercial enterprise, noting that CSIRO’s “reputation as a research 
institution has been impugned just as another company’s brand 
recognition or good will may be damaged.”386 The case is notable both 
for demonstrating that nonpracticing academic patentees may obtain 
injunctive relief387 and for the markedly commercial characterization 
of such institutions. 
f. Ownership of Federally Funded Inventions.  More recently, the 
Supreme Court also rejected special treatment for universities in a 
case involving the ownership of federally funded patents. In Board of 
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular 
Systems, Inc.,388 the Court considered whether the Bayh-Dole Act 
vests title to university inventions directly in universities themselves 
or whether title initially vests in faculty inventors.389 Stanford argued 
that the Act reflects a federal policy in favor of university-based 
technology transfer and that it vests title to inventions directly in 
universities themselves.390 The Association of American Universities, 
the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association of 
Public and Land-grant Universities, the Association of University 
 
 384. CSIRO, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 604. 
 385. Id.  
 386. Id. at 605. 
 387. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 
1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
631, 655 (2007). From one perspective, this may represent an instance of academic 
exceptionalism, as universities have achieved higher-than-average rates of obtaining injunctions 
relative to other NPEs. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the 
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (2012); see BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 110, at 139 
(“[A]n aberrational Texas district court . . . held that special rules should apply to nonprofit 
entities.”). Although this may be interpreted as exceptionalism, it may also reflect courts’ 
lumping together of universities with traditional commercial patentees (that is, productive, 
innovative entities) as opposed to grouping them with less favorable NPEs. 
 388. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2188 (2011). 
 389. Id. at 2192. 
 390. Brief of Petitioner at 30, 38, Roche, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (No. 09-1159). 
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Technology Managers, and the Council on Government Relations all 
supported Stanford’s argument.391 The Court, however, disagreed. It 
held that the Act did not modify longstanding patent doctrine 
regarding the ownership of inventions, which vests title to inventions 
in inventors themselves.392 Applying the general law of patent 
ownership to university inventions, the Court again rejected academic 
exceptionalism. 
3. The Integration of Universities Within Patent Doctrine.  In 
several ways, patent decisions from the past three decades reflect the 
internalization of academic science within patent doctrine. Expansive 
approaches to patentability and the changing nature of university 
research have created an environment in which many outputs of 
academic research now fall within the patent system’s regulatory 
grasp. Academic science—previously peripheral to the patent 
system—is now a frequent subject of litigation and doctrine. Indeed, 
academic science has played a key role in shaping cutting-edge patent 
doctrine. To be sure, courts have used doctrines governing priority, 
statutory bars, and the written description requirement to invalidate 
university patents. However, courts have applied these doctrines not 
based on a principled stance that academic discoveries are 
categorically inappropriate for patenting, but to rebuff overreaching 
behavior by zealous university patentees. 
During this period, courts have largely rejected academic 
exceptionalism. In some cases, this rejection has been based on a 
more commercially oriented conception of universities. Earlier 
doctrinal hedges separating the patent system from academic science 
were often predicated on conceptions of academic entities as 
nonpecuniary stewards of the public interest. In recent decades, 
however, court opinions have reflected a new reality, lumping 
universities and scientists together with commercial, revenue-seeking 
entities. In a variety of doctrinal contexts—perhaps most notably the 
common law experimental use exception—courts have treated 
universities as just another set of commercial actors in the patent 
system. Here again, patent law exhibits some degree of reciprocity 
between norms and doctrine: to the extent that universities have shed 
 
 391. Brief of Ass’n of Am. Univs. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–5, 
Roche, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (No. 09-1159). 
 392. Roche, 131 S. Ct. at 2199. 
LEE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:47 PM 
62 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1 
traditional academic norms and embraced commercialism, patent 
courts will not treat them any differently from other parties. 
Of course, one must place these developments within the context 
of broader trends in patent law. In many ways, universities’ 
integration into the patent system was part and parcel of the patent-
friendly doctrine of the Supreme Court and especially the Federal 
Circuit in the 1980s and 1990s.393 Expansive interpretations of 
patentable subject matter, utility, and nonobviousness helped extend 
patent protection to more university discoveries, thus fueling the 
institutional changes to which courts later responded. Interestingly, 
universities have also been caught up in the more recent trend of both 
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit narrowing patentability 
since the late 1990s. Decisions constraining patentable subject 
matter,394 utility,395 nonobviousness,396 and (as discussed above) the 
written description requirement397 have made it more difficult to 
obtain patents. In some respects, these changes have 
disproportionately impacted university inventions, which tend to be 
rather upstream and embryonic. 
Viewed from one angle, courts’ flattening of the 
academic/commercial distinction and the rejection of preferential 
treatment for universities is not surprising. Historically, opportunities 
for universities to argue for (and for courts to reject) academic 
exceptionalism were limited simply because universities were not 
significant litigants in the patent system. It is somewhat predictable 
that as universities have become more active in litigation, they have 
argued for doctrinal interpretations favorable to their interests and 
that courts have been skeptical of such claims. After all, the United 
States is committed to a unitary patent system that at least nominally 
treats all inventors and inventions equally.398 As discussed further 
 
 393. See supra notes 312–23 and accompanying text. 
 394. Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010). 
 395. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting an application claiming 
ESTs because of a lack of specific and substantial utility). 
 396. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 397. See supra Part III.B.2.c. 
 398. As Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have demonstrated, however, the patent 
system subtly distinguishes between different inventive fields. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (“[W]e 
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below, courts have been largely prudent in rejecting universities’ 
arguments for preferential interpretations of patentability doctrines, 
particularly given the embryonic, upstream nature of many academic 
inventions.399 Given this state of affairs, however, it is quite curious 
that even though academic exceptionalism has largely died in the 
courts, it has adopted new life in the legislative sphere, a development 
to which this Article now turns. 
IV.  STATUTORY INTERNALIZATION AND THE REVIVAL OF 
ACADEMIC EXCEPTIONALISM 
Turning from doctrine to statute, the twin themes of academic 
internalization and exceptionalism take interesting turns in the 
context of legislative patent reform. In significant part, the 
internalization of academic science within patent law, which started in 
doctrine, has reached its apex in the legislative arena. The interests of 
academic science, formerly peripheral to the patent system, are now 
hardwired in the patent statute. Within this project of “statutory 
internalization,” academic exceptionalism has evolved in interesting 
ways. On the one hand, academic exceptionalism has been completely 
erased to the extent that the interests of academic science help shape 
general rules of patentability that apply to all inventions. Such 
internalization suggests that there is nothing “exceptional” about 
academic science at all. On the other hand, academic exceptionalism 
has intensified in the guise of specific statutory carve-outs for 
universities, thus illustrating classic legislative rent-seeking.400 The 
curious result is that even though courts have rejected academic 
exceptionalism, it has achieved new life in Congress. 
 
have noticed an increasing divergence between the rules themselves and the application of the 
rules to different industries.”). 
 399. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 400. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1867 (2000); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: 
Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000). See generally 
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. 
Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980). Of course, interest-group lobbying is endemic to other 
patent legislation as well, including the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999. See Edward 
R. Ergenzinger Jr., The American Inventor’s Protection Act: A Legislative History, 7 WAKE 
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145, 146 (2006). 
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A. The Bayh-Dole Act 
Of course, the primary legislation that intensified universities’ 
participation in the patent system is the Bayh-Dole Act. As noted 
above, myriad political and economic factors motivated the Act,401 
which accelerated the rise in university patenting already underway in 
1980.402 This Section extends the earlier discussion by highlighting the 
significant involvement of university representatives in securing the 
Act’s passage. 
University officials were involved throughout the Act’s genesis 
and passage. Early in the bill’s drafting, Ralph Davis (patent 
administrator from Purdue University), Howard Bremer (a WARF 
administrator), and Norman Latker (NIH’s first patent counsel) met 
with Senator Birch Bayh and an aid to convince them of the 
worthiness of the proposed legislation that would become the Bayh-
Dole Act.403 In significant part, university officials were motivated to 
support the bill because of their positive experiences with patenting 
federally funded inventions under IPAs.404 According to Professor 
Elizabeth Popp Berman, the “proto-institution” of IPAs helped 
establish university patenting as a legitimate activity and galvanized a 
professional community of technology transfer administrators around 
protecting and expanding university patent rights.405 This professional 
community ultimately organized under the rubric of the Association 
of University Technology Managers (AUTM), which argued 
forcefully in favor of the Bayh-Dole Act and has continued to lobby 
in favor of university patenting.406 Among other actions, advocates for 
the Act employed an effective political strategy of framing the Act in 
terms of enhancing U.S. economic competitiveness,407 thus connecting 
the legislation to important national imperatives. 
 
 401. See supra notes 168–80 and accompanying text. 
 402. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 403. Berman, supra note 46, at 856. 
 404. See Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 95 
(2004) (describing the testimony of WARF’s Howard Bremer in favor of the proposed 
legislation). 
 405. Berman, supra note 46, at 836; see Mowery & Sampat, supra note 28, at 119. 
 406. AUTM began as the Society of University Patent Administrators (SUPA) in 1974, 
which changed its name in the late 1980s. SUPA members participated in the hearings leading 
to the Bayh-Dole Act. See Jon Sandelin, SUPA/AUTM Role in Bayh/Dole Legislation 1, 7–8, 30 
BAYH-DOLE, http://b-d30.org/app/webroot/doc/AUTMrole_in_BayhDole.pdf. 
 407. Berman, supra note 46, at 854.  
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Throughout legislative hearings, university representatives 
extolled the benefits of vesting title to federally funded patents in 
universities.408 For instance, representatives argued that universities 
were better conduits for technology transfer than government 
agencies because they were more familiar with the inventions at issue 
and had direct access to faculty inventors.409 In particular, universities 
could facilitate the direct interaction between inventors and licensees 
that is often critical to technology transfer.410 Summarizing the 
involvement of universities in the bill’s passage, Bremer notes, 
“[F]inally universities were speaking with a loud single voice in this 
arena. I think that is ultimately what carried the day.”411 
The Bayh-Dole Act represents an important instance of the 
statutory internalization of academic science within the patent system. 
The Act significantly deepened universities’ participation in patenting 
and licensing. On a meta-level, it also represented a political 
awakening for universities, thus integrating them within a legislative 
system of lobbying Congress for favorable patent legislation, a 
practice that universities have continued with fervor. 
B. The CREATE Act 
Even though the Bayh-Dole Act changed federal policy 
governing the ownership of publicly funded patents, it did not change 
the general rules of patentability. More recent legislation, however, 
has done just that to favor the interests of academic research, further 
illustrating the statutory internalization of academic science within 
the patent system. 
For example, university interests helped change the law of 
nonobviousness in the Cooperative Research and Technology 
Enhancement Act of 2004 (the CREATE Act).412 Because this 
 
 408. Id. at 856. 
 409. See Government Patent Policies: Institutional Patent Agreements: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Monopoly & Anticompetitive Activities of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 95th 
Cong. 383 (1978) (statement of Howard W. Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wis. Alumni Research 
Found.). 
 410. Id. at 255 (statement of Charles H. Herz, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Sci. Found.); id. at 309, 
311 (statement of Thomas F. Jones, Vice Pres., Research, Mass. Inst. of Tech.). 
 411. Berman, supra note 46, at 856 (quoting Interview by Barry Teicher with Howard W. 
Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wis. Alumni Research Found. (2001) (on file with Univ. of Wis.-
Madison Oral History Program)).  
 412. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-453, § 2, 118 Stat. 3596, 3596 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006 & Supp. V 
2011)). 
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legislation is rather technical, some context is in order. Before the 
CREATE Act, Congress had enacted a specific provision in 1984, 
which was recodified in 1995 at 35 U.S.C. § 103(c),413 to foster 
research, development, and patenting within large corporate 
enterprises. In particular, § 103(c) prevented certain types of 
nonpublic subject matter from serving as “prior art” that could render 
a later claimed invention obvious when the subject matter and the 
invention were “owned by the same person or subject to an obligation 
of assignment to the same person.”414 In the absence of such a safe 
harbor, certain nonpublic information generated by one research 
team within an organization (such as Merck) might constitute prior 
art that would render obvious the claimed inventions of other 
research teams within the same organization. In 1995, however, the 
Federal Circuit held that the § 103(c) safe harbor did not apply to 
researchers from different organizations working pursuant to a joint 
research agreement.415 Among other implications, this holding denied 
the benefit of the § 103(c) safe harbor to university scientists and 
corporate scientists who worked together under a joint research 
agreement with no obligation to assign their inventions to a common 
entity. Without this safe harbor, the work of one party to a joint 
research agreement could render obvious the inventions of another 
party to that same agreement. 
To ameliorate this situation, Congress enacted the CREATE 
Act, which extended the prior art safe harbor to joint research 
agreements.416 The CREATE Act thus changed the law of 
nonobviousness by establishing that certain forms of nonpublic 
information would not count as prior art for nonobviousness in the 
context of a joint research agreement. Significantly, Congress enacted 
the CREATE Act in large part to promote university-industry 
research collaborations.417 In introducing the CREATE Act, Senator 
Orrin Hatch stated: 
 
 413. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 1, 98 Stat. 3383, 3384, 
amended by Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat 351, 351 (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(c) (Supp. I 1996)). 
 414. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011). 
 415. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 416. See CREATE Act § 2, 35 U.S.C. § 103(c), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 285. 
 417. See Patent Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20 (2005) 
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2795] (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Dir., Wis. 
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This bill makes a narrow, but important change in our patent laws to 
ensure that the American public will benefit from the results of 
collaborative research efforts that combine the erudition of great 
public universities with the entrepreneurial savvy of private 
enterprises. . . . [W]e must encourage—not discourage—public 
institutions and private entrepreneurs to combine their respective 
talents in joint research efforts.418 
Similarly, Senator Patrick Leahy specifically linked the CREATE Act 
to the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act: “When Congress passed the 
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, the law encouraged private entities and not-
for-profits such as universities to form collaborative partnerships in 
order to spur innovation.”419 Members of Congress intended the 
CREATE Act to facilitate even more of these partnerships (thus 
further integrating universities and commercial interests) by altering 
the rules of nonobviousness. Indeed, the CREATE Act has enhanced 
the importance of joint research agreements between universities and 
industry.420 Far from being on the periphery of the patent system, 
interests related to academic science are now helping to determine 
general rules of patentability. As we will see, this trend finds even 
greater expression in the America Invents Act. 
C. The America Invents Act 
The statutory internalization of academic science within patent 
law has reached its zenith with the America Invents Act (AIA). In 
2011, after six years of debate, Congress enacted the AIA, the most 
sweeping patent reform since the modern patent act of 1952421 and 
arguably the most significant reform since the establishment of an 
examination system in 1836.422 The AIA covers an enormous amount 
of subject matter, and the interests of academic science are reflected 
in several provisions. In some sense, the formative influence of 
 
Alumni Research Foundation) (“Science today depends on collaborative research, and the 
CREATE Act will stimulate numerous inventive activities in the future.”); James G. McEwen, 
Is the Cure Worse than the Disease? An Overview of the Patent Reform Act of 2005, 5 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 55, 62 (2005) (discussing the CREATE Act). 
 418. 150 CONG. REC. 3999 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 419. Id. (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 420. Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 364; see Bagley, supra note 37, at 228 (noting that “many 
researchers receive study funding from industry sources”). 
 421. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792. 
 422. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 
FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435 (2012). 
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academic interests within the AIA represents a complete inversion of 
academic exceptionalism. Such internalization suggests that the 
interests of the university community are no longer “exceptional” and 
that they may legitimately inform general rules of patentability that 
apply to all inventions. 
1. First-Inventor-To-File-or-Disclose.  The influence of academic 
science is greatest in the most prominent reform of the AIA, the shift 
from first-to-invent to first-inventor-to-file.423 Nominally, the AIA 
shifts the United States from a “first-to-invent” jurisdiction, in which 
priority is based on the date of invention, to a “first-to-file” 
jurisdiction, in which priority is based on the date of filing a patent 
application.424 Congress made this move to simplify priority 
determinations, reduce administrative costs, and harmonize U.S. law 
with international norms (virtually all other countries have first-to-file 
regimes). As this Article will demonstrate, however, universities 
played an instrumental role in ensuring that the AIA does not create 
a pure first-to-file system. 
Initially, university representatives vehemently opposed the shift 
to first-to-file.425 Universities favored the traditional first-to-invent 
system in which they could rely on early inventive activities by 
academic scientists (who generally keep good records of such 
activities) to establish priority vis-à-vis parties who invented later but 
filed patent applications earlier. Academic representatives argued 
that a “pure” first-to-file system would impose significant costs on 
universities, which would have to rush to file expensive patent 
applications on all promising technologies to maintain patent rights. 
Furthermore, first-to-file conflicted with academic norms of rapid 
publication. University scientists often seek to publish their 
findings—which may include descriptions of patentable 
technologies—as soon as possible. Under a pure first-to-file system, 
however, any publication prior to filing a patent application destroys 
novelty. Such concerns are mitigated in the traditional first-to-invent 
system in which novelty is based on the date of invention and in 
which the statutory bar regime contains a one-year grace period 
during which an inventor can disclose his invention before filing a 
 
 423. See id. at 449. 
 424. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102).  
 425. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 110, at 101. 
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patent application and still maintain patent rights. For all of these 
reasons, in 2005 testimony regarding a previous patent reform bill, 
managing director of WARF Carl Gulbrandsen argued that “[t]he 
first-inventor-to-file proposal would be a hardship for a vast majority 
of universities.”426 
Based in significant part on university pressure, the AIA does 
not create a pure first-to-file system. Rather, it creates what has been 
characterized as a “first inventor-to-file-or-disclose” regime. It retains 
vestiges of the older statutory bar system by integrating a one-year 
grace period within a first-to-file system.427 Because of this grace 
period, certain public disclosures of an invention within one year 
before filing a patent application will not destroy that invention’s 
novelty.428 The retention of a one-year grace period is rather unique to 
the United States; many other jurisdictions have an “absolute 
novelty” regime in which any public disclosure of an invention prior 
to filing a patent application destroys novelty.429 
The retention of a one-year grace period within a nominal first-
to-file system represents a significant concession to university 
interests. Not surprisingly, universities played an important role in 
crafting this regime.430 Although other stakeholders also advocated for 
retaining the grace period,431 universities represented a particularly 
vocal and influential group. In hearings from 2005, Charles Phelps, 
provost of the University of Rochester, shared his thoughts on behalf 
 
 426. Hearing on H.R. 2795, supra note 417, at 29–30 (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, 
Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.). 
 427. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 286 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b)). 
 428. This is one reason why the U.S. system is often called a “first-inventor-to-file system.” 
A first inventor who publicly discloses an invention and then files a patent application within 
one year will prevail against an earlier filer (but later inventor) who, for example, simply copied 
the invention from the prior inventor. 
 429. See Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1023, 1032 (2012). 
 430. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2795, supra note 417, at 59 (statement of Carl E. 
Gulbrandsen, Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.). In general, universities have 
developed a very significant presence on Capitol Hill; between 1998 and 2007, lobby 
expenditures by universities increased from $30.8 million to $90.2 million. Jay P. Kesan & 
Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1359 tbl.3 
(2009). The percentage of lobbying expenditures devoted to intellectual property laws, however, 
is unknown and likely relatively low. See id. at 1359. 
 431. See 157 CONG. REC. S1098 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar) 
(“[W]e have heard from stakeholders from across the spectrum—from high tech and life 
sciences to universities and small inventors—in support of the transition to the first-to-file 
system.”). 
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of the Association of American Universities, American Council on 
Education, Association of American Medical Colleges, and Council 
on Governmental Relations. Phelps explained the importance of 
maintaining a grace period for academic inventors, who often publish 
their findings immediately and need time to assess whether to patent 
them.432 According to Phelps, university groups would support the 
transition to first-inventor-to-file only upon retaining a one-year 
grace period.433 Maintaining a grace period had long been on the 
academic legislative agenda. As far back as 2004, the National 
Research Council recommended that the United States retain a grace 
period and persuade other countries to adopt one, particularly to 
accommodate academic patentees.434 
The resulting one-year grace period is especially beneficial to 
academic inventors. As noted, this one-year grace period 
accommodates the academic norm of speedy publication. For 
example, if a faculty inventor publishes an article describing some 
new technology, then files a patent application within one year of 
publication, she would not defeat her own novelty.435 Publication 
offers a particularly important benefit, for it even protects a patent 
applicant against disclosures by independent inventors. Unlike a pure 
first-to-file system, the AIA creates a first-inventor-to-file-or-disclose 
regime that heavily benefits academic inventors. 
The legislative history of the AIA reveals the importance of 
university interests in retaining the grace period. Senator Patrick 
Leahy, one of the sponsors of the bill, stated that “the first-inventor-
to-file provisions that are included in the America Invents Act were 
drafted with careful attention to the needs of universities and small 
inventors.”436 A House committee report similarly notes that “[t]he 
Committee heard from universities and small inventors, in particular, 
about the importance of maintaining that grace period in our 
 
 432. Perspectives on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 75 (2005) 
[hereinafter Perspectives on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing] (statement of 
Charles E. Phelps, Provost, Univ. of Rochester). 
 433. See id. (“[T]he broad grace period of current law operating in a first inventor to file 
system would encourage open communication of research discoveries and preserve a broad 
opportunity for the filing of patent applications.”). 
 434. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 127 (2004). 
 435. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) 
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A)). 
 436. 157 CONG. REC. S1090 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).  
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system,”437 and goes on to cite testimony from Phelps and 
Gulbrandsen, among others.438 
One must not paint with too broad of a brush, however, and it is 
important to acknowledge internal dissent within the university 
community regarding the shift to first-inventor-to-file. Notably, 
WARF led a consortium of universities in breaking ranks with most 
higher-education associations to oppose the AIA, primarily because it 
perceived the “safeguards” of the first-inventor-to-file-or-disclose 
regime to be inadequate.439 Such concerns were based both on the 
lengthy amount of time it takes for academic papers to be published 
as well as the uncertainty surrounding the sufficiency of a prior 
disclosure that would be necessary to maintain novelty in the first-
inventor-to-file-or-disclose system.440 Notwithstanding the criticisms of 
WARF and its cohorts, the grace period provisions of the AIA were 
adopted in significant part to accommodate university interests. 
The adoption of a grace period in the new first-inventor-to-file 
regime reflects a significant stage in the statutory internalization of 
academic science within patent law. As the AIA’s grace period 
provisions reveal, the interests of academic science have journeyed to 
the center of patent law; a once-marginal activity is now helping to 
define general rules of novelty that apply to all inventions. Other 
legislative reforms further illustrate the internalization of academic 
interests within patent law, though they offer a new twist on the 
theme of academic exceptionalism. 
2. The Prior User Rights Defense.  In other areas of the AIA, 
academic interests are manifested not in altering the general rules of 
patent law, but in establishing specific carve-outs for academic 
entities. In this sense, academic exceptionalism, which courts have 
rejected in doctrine, has been resurrected in statute. 
For example, universities preferentially benefit from the newly 
expanded “prior user rights” defense to patent infringement. In the 
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,441 Congress established a 
 
 437. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 41 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 71.  
 438. Id.  
 439. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Several Universities Oppose Pending ‘Patent Reform’ 
Legislation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 21, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/several-
universities-oppose-pending-patent-reform-legislation/34091. 
 440. I thank Jacob Rooksby for these helpful observations. 
 441. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501, 
1501A-552 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 273, 297, 311–318). 
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relatively narrow defense to infringement based on one’s prior 
commercial use of an invention before another party patented it. For 
example, if A reduced to practice a process and (secretly) used it for 
over a year before B filed a patent application on it, A could invoke 
its prior use as a defense if B sued A for patent infringement. 
Although this prior use defense covered parties who engaged in prior 
“commercial” use of a patented invention,442 the statute clarified that 
the defense extended to “activities performed by a nonprofit research 
laboratory or nonprofit entity such as a university, research center, or 
hospital” as long as these activities aimed to benefit the public.443 The 
prior user rights defense thus applied to a university that used an 
invention for a year before it was patented by another party. Notably, 
this provision reflects an instance of statutory academic 
exceptionalism, as Congress stretched the definition of “commercial 
use” to encompass use by universities. This defense was rather 
narrow, however, as it only applied to alleged infringement of certain 
patented business methods.444 
With the AIA, Congress expanded the prior user rights defense 
beyond patented business methods to patented processes more 
generally. Universities accused of infringement fully benefit from this 
expanded defense, for the AIA preserves the notion that prior 
“[n]onprofit laboratory use” constitutes a prior commercial use that 
relieves a defendant of infringement liability.445 Thus, even though 
laboratory use by an academic institution seems to be the opposite of 
commercial use, it still qualifies for the “prior commercial use” 
defense to patent infringement. 
More importantly, under the AIA, university patentees receive 
special treatment when infringers attempt to assert the prior user 
rights defense against them. In a provision entitled “University 
Exception,” the AIA states that a defendant may not invoke the prior 
user rights defense if the patent in suit “was, at the time the invention 
was made, owned or subject to an obligation of assignment to either 
an institution of higher education . . . or a technology transfer 
organization . . . .”446 In other words, a defendant may not invoke the 
 
 442. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 5, 125 Stat. 284, 297 (2011). 
 443. Id. § 273(a)(2). 
 444. See id. § 273(a)(3).  
 445. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 5, 125 Stat. at 297 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
273(c)(2)). 
 446. Id., 125 Stat. at 298 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)(A)) (emphasis added).  
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prior user rights defense when sued by a university for patent 
infringement.447 This, of course, greatly and asymmetrically benefits 
university patentees.448 
Not surprisingly, university representatives were quite influential 
in securing this preferential treatment.449 Originally, university 
representatives argued against expanding the prior user rights 
exception because of the belief that such a defense would encourage 
protecting patentable inventions as trade secrets, which would 
negatively impact academic institutions.450 WARF in particular 
opposed any categorical expansion of prior user rights.451 Academic 
representatives would only support expanding the prior use rights 
defense if it contained special accommodations for university 
patentees.452 Exercising their political muscle, universities helped 
secure preferential treatment in the AIA.453 
 
 447. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 71 (2011) reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 96 
(“H.R. 1249 would prohibit public and private entities from using the prior-use defense to 
patent infringement claims for business processes brought by a university or technology-transfer 
organization.”). 
 448. See Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded 
Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECH. 953, 953–54 (2012) (“The privileged position universities and 
their assignees and/or licensees now hold in patent litigation, even against prior, independent 
commercializers, makes proper information as to whether those patents involved federal 
funding even more important.”). 
 449. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 44, reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 75 (“This 
narrow expansion of prior-user rights balances the interests of patent holders, including 
universities, against the legitimate concerns of businesses that want to avoid infringement suits 
relating to processes that they developed and used prior to another party acquiring related 
patents.” (emphasis added)). 
 450. See Hearing on H.R. 2795, supra note 417, at 29 (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, 
Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.); Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: 
Hearing, supra note 380, at 101 (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni 
Research Found.); Perspectives on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing, supra 
note 432, at 73 (statement of Charles E. Phelps, Provost, Univ. of Rochester). 
 451. See Briefing Paper, Wis. Alumni Research Found., U.S. Patent Reform and the Case 
Against Expansion of Prior User Rights (Apr. 13, 2011), available at http://democrats.judiciary.
house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/WARF110413.pdf (“Now, as 
patent reform legislation nears completion, an attempt by proponents of prior user rights has 
been made to turn back the clock and enact language that would benefit a few at the expense of 
society.”). 
 452. See Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: Hearing, supra note 380, at 101 
(statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.) (“Prior user 
rights establish a general defense against infringement. WARF opposed the proposed 
expansion.”). 
 453. See Memorandum from Hunter R. Rawlings III, President, Ass’n of Am. Univs., Molly 
Corbett Broad, President, Am. Council on Educ., Darrell G. Kirch, President & CEO, Ass’n of 
Am. Med. Colls. & M. Peter McPherson, President, Ass’n of Pub. & Land-grant Univs., to Ass’n 
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3. Micro Entity Status.  Finally, the AIA exhibits a rather blatant 
example of academic exceptionalism by lowering fees for patent 
applicants under an obligation to assign or license their applications 
to universities.454 Again, this represents a new (and rather explicit) 
model of academic exceptionalism based in statute rather than 
doctrine. Under the AIA, such applicants qualify for “micro entity” 
status and are thus eligible for a 75 percent reduction in fees. 
Although the name suggests that micro entities are individuals or 
small firms, this is a misnomer, as the micro entity categorization also 
encompasses inventors at institutions of higher education. 
The political horse-trading at the heart of this provision is rather 
apparent in its legislative history. In March 2011, Senator Harry Reid 
offered an amendment to the micro entity provision that would have 
extended such status to public universities participating in a program 
aimed at benefitting institutions deemed to be receiving an 
inadequate share of federal research and development funds.455 
Senators from states with universities not participating in this 
program objected, and eventually the Senate voted to extend micro 
entity status to all public universities.456 In the House of 
Representatives, objections from private universities led members of 
Congress to expand micro entity status to all institutions of higher 
education, both public and private.457 In this manner, university 
interests won a significant reduction of patent fees in the AIA.458 Not 
surprisingly, universities,459 research institutions,460 TTOs,461 and 
 
Constituencies, Support H.R. 1249, the America Invents Act 2 (June 14, 2011), http://judiciary.
house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform%20PDFS/AAU%20ACE%20AAMC%20APLU.pdf. 
 454. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 319 (2011) 
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 123(d)).  
 455. See Matal, supra note 422, at 495. 
 456. See id. 
 457. See id. at 496. 
 458. Universities won preferential treatment in other areas of the AIA as well. See Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act § 4, 125 Stat. at 294 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 115(d)) (allowing 
patent applicants (such as universities) to file a substitute statement when an inventor does not 
execute the ordinarily required oath); id. § 13(a), 125 Stat. at 327 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
202(c)(7)(E)(i)) (increasing royalties that universities can retain from licensing inventions at 
government-owned, contractor-operated research facilities); H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 43 
(2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 73 (noting that the AIA preserves the intent of the 
CREATE Act to promote joint research activities and subtly expanding its reach). 
 459. Comment from Rockefeller Univ., to U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Comment on 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Register, Volume 77, Number 104, May 30, 2012 
Changes to Implement Micro Entity Status for Paying Patent Fees (July 3, 2012), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/me_rockefeller_03jul2012.pdf. 
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organizations such as the Association of American Universities, the 
Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, the Association of 
American Medical Colleges, and the Council on Governmental 
Relations462 all actively contributed to rulemaking governing this 
special treatment for universities. Ultimately, preferential treatment 
for universities—previously peripheral players in the patent system—
is now hardwired in patent statutes and regulations. 
V.  ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENTS, AND PRESCRIPTIONS 
A. The Mutual Internalization of Academic Science and Patent Law 
and the Evolution of Academic Exceptionalism 
Historically segregated, academic science and patent law have 
over the past several decades engaged in a process of mutual 
internalization. Along the way, academic exceptionalism has evolved 
considerably. In the early to mid-twentieth century, academic 
researchers largely adhered to scientific norms that eschewed patents, 
and universities’ early forays into the patent system were marked by 
uniquely academic, noncommercial values. For its part, patent law 
exhibited academic exceptionalism by excluding the fruits of 
academic science and sometimes treating academic entities differently 
than ordinary commercial actors. Due to a host of developments 
culminating in the late twentieth century, however, patents began to 
permeate academic culture.463 Contemporary universities have 
 
 460. Comment from Priti Phukan & Thomas Fitting, Office of Patent Counsel, Scripps Inst., 
to U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Comments on Proposed Rule Making—Micro Entity Status 
(June 21, 2012, 1:26 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/me_fitting_21jun2012.
pdf. 
 461. Comment from Dale Zetocha, Exec. Dir., N.D. State Univ. Research Found., to U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, Comments Provided in Response to “Changes to Implement Micro 
Entity Status for Paying Patent Fees” from Vol. 77, N. 104 of the Federal Register, in Reference 
to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (June 21, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/
comments/me_ndsurf_27jul2012.pdf. 
 462. See Comment from Hunter R. Rawlings III, President, Ass’n of Am. Univs., Peter 
McPherson, President, Ass’n of Pub. & Land-grant Univs., Darrell G. Kirch, President & CEO, 
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. & Anthony P. DeCrappeo, President, Council on Governmental 
Relations, to James Engel, Senior Legal Advisor, Office of Patent Legal Admin., Office of the 
Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, Changes to Implement Micro Entity Status for 
Paying Patent Fees (RIN 0651-AC78) (July 27, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/
comments/me_aau_27jul2012.pdf. 
 463. This transformation has been particularly stark in the life sciences. Whereas 
universities were historically wary of profiting from health technologies, biomedical research 
has been a site of intensive patenting in contemporary times. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 28, 
at 786. 
LEE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  4:47 PM 
76 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1 
internalized patents, and the patent system has internalized university 
science. Nowadays, university inventors and inventions are frequent 
subjects of patent doctrine, and courts perceive little difference 
between universities and profit-oriented actors in the patent system. 
Based in part on the increasingly commercial tenor of university 
patenting, courts have systematically rejected academic 
exceptionalism in patent doctrine. The internalization of academic 
science has reached its zenith with legislative patent reform, in which 
the interests of academic science held much sway. On the one hand, 
academic exceptionalism has vanished to the extent that the interests 
of academic science now inform general rules of patentability. On the 
other hand, academic exceptionalism has been reborn in statute, the 
product of legislative rent-seeking by universities. 
Although the shifting normative status of universities has helped 
drive these developments, it is important to recognize other 
contributing factors as well. Focusing on patent doctrine, 
contemporary courts’ rejection of academic exceptionalism is part 
and parcel of broader structural trends in patent law. As a historical 
matter, the sharp rise in university patenting—and courts’ rejection of 
academic exceptionalism—has coincided with the tenure of the 
Federal Circuit. Given this court’s mission to unify patent law and 
make it more consistent,464 a project of eliminating preferential 
treatment for a particular set of institutions is not surprising. Even 
though this unifying tendency may contribute to the Federal Circuit’s 
rejection of academic exceptionalism, however, the changing 
normative status of universities remains quite relevant. The Federal 
Circuit has frequently referenced the commercial nature of modern 
university patenting in rejecting any preferential treatment for such 
institutions. Furthermore, the rejection of academic exceptionalism is 
not unique to the Federal Circuit: the Supreme Court and district 
courts have also rejected preferential treatment for universities as 
well. 
In many ways, the developments described here reflect increased 
aggressiveness on the part of universities in multiple contexts. First, 
university research has become more scientifically aggressive, shifting 
from passively observing nature to actively manipulating the building 
blocks of life. The development of monoclonal antibodies and 
recombinant DNA technology, and the concomitant rise of 
 
 464. See Dreyfuss, supra note 201, at 7 (“[C]hannelling patent cases into a single appellate 
forum would create a stable, uniform law . . . .”). 
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biotechnology, ushered in an era in which the fruits of academic 
research increasingly cross the threshold to qualify as patentable 
inventions. Second, universities became more commercially 
aggressive as they sought to realize (and enlarge) profits from 
intellectual property. Third, universities became more politically 
aggressive as they turned to the legislative process to consolidate their 
gains from technology transfer. Now that universities have become 
entrenched within the patent system, they have wielded their political 
might to help regulate the legal framework that regulates them. In 
other areas of intellectual property law, parties have invoked the 
trope of the “romantic author” to justify stronger protection.465 
Somewhat analogously, representatives of academia have invoked the 
rhetorical trope of the “romantic university” to justify preferential 
treatment under the patent laws. Although universities may indeed 
possess some unique characteristics, in many ways, this behavior 
simply reveals that universities act like typical rent-seeking 
institutions in both the economic and political spheres. 
Ultimately, these developments help define a narrative of 
reciprocity between norms and law.466 Historically, relations between 
universities and the patent system were marked by a stable 
equilibrium in which university scientists rarely patented their 
discoveries and the patent system regarded universities—in their 
limited interactions—through the lens of academic exceptionalism. 
Later, legal changes such as the Bayh-Dole Act and Chakrabarty 
helped usher universities more deeply into the patent system. Once 
there, universities began to behave more like commercial entities, 
thus losing their special normative status. In an iterative fashion, the 
patent system responded to its own creation by highlighting the 
increasingly commercial nature of universities and rejecting academic 
exceptionalism. And in strictly construing rules regarding priority and 
prior art, courts interpreting patent doctrine actually pushed 
universities to act more like commercial entities. Universities, eager 
to consolidate their newfound gains, turned to the legislative sphere 
 
 465. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY x–xiii (1996) (noting that invocations of the 
“romantic author” have contributed to a proliferation of intellectual property rights); Keith 
Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of 
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1333–38 (1996); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: 
The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 456. 
 466. See Rai, supra note 7, at 84 (describing the dynamic relationship between norms and 
law). 
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to shape patent reform, thus fully integrating academic science into 
the fabric of patent law. 
B. Assessments and Prescriptions 
Turning from the descriptive to the normative, this Article 
returns to the question of whether and how the patent system should 
treat universities differently than other actors. Given the patent 
system’s historical commitment to a unitary system that treats all 
parties equally, the burden of persuasion rests on those who would 
extend special treatment to academic entities. In theory, however, 
social welfare concerns may justify such exceptionalism; as Professor 
Margo Bagley notes, “Some may question whether university 
inventors should receive special treatment in the patent system. The 
answer is they should not, unless special treatment will inure to the 
public good.”467 This Article argues that universities are sufficiently 
unique actors in the patent system that they warrant differential 
treatment in some, but not all, contexts. 
In important ways, the question of how universities should 
interact with the patent system depends on one’s normative vision of 
universities in society. As mentioned earlier, there is great diversity 
among academic institutions.468 The norms, histories, and missions of 
public versus private, secular versus religious, and land-grant versus 
non-land-grant institutions may lead to different visions about a 
university’s role in society and how patenting and technology transfer 
advance (or do not advance) that role.469 Such institutional missions 
should arise through processes of self-governance based on 
consultation with relevant stakeholders. In general, however, 
universities as a whole occupy a distinct and discrete role in society as 
nonprofit institutions committed to advancing knowledge, teaching 
students, and serving their respective communities. As a descriptive 
and normative matter, universities are different in important ways 
from the typical commercial entities that fall within the regulatory 
grasp of the patent system. It is within this very broad normative 
framework that this Article offers the assessments and prescriptions 
that follow. 
 
 467. Bagley, supra note 37, at 265. 
 468. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 469. See Lee, supra note 216, at 2234–35 (noting a high degree of diversity among 
universities and approaches to technology transfer). 
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The question of how the patent system should regulate university 
science is further complicated in several ways. First, the patent system 
is not a monolithic entity but is instead comprised of a constellation of 
regulatory forces including courts, Congress, the USPTO, funding 
agencies, and civil society. Second and relatedly, regulation can take 
the form of hard law as well as more informal soft regulation (such as 
through the lever of federal research funding) or even public 
pressure. Third, universities intersect with the patent system in 
different ways, for example as patentees (and enforcers), licensors, 
and infringers. As an overarching principle, this Article argues that 
the right regulatory approach will vary based on context. 
As suggested above, this analysis proceeds on the principle that 
academic exceptionalism in the abstract is neither categorically good 
nor bad. The key inquiry—which is an admittedly difficult one—is 
recognizing when exceptional treatment is warranted because 
differential rules for university research serve broader social 
interests.470 In most contexts, general rules of patent law should apply 
without exception to academic entities. Thus, for example, this 
Article argues against any preferential treatment for universities in 
the basic requirements of patentability; in this manner, among other 
implications, existing doctrine can usefully constrain universities’ 
ability to patent upstream, embryonic inventions. In the remedies 
context, courts should carefully exercise their equitable discretion to 
deny injunctions to university patentees in certain circumstances, thus 
enhancing access to academic technologies. Turning to soft 
regulation, federal funding agencies should leverage the power of the 
purse to encourage more progressive patenting and licensing 
decisions by patentees. In some instances, public policy objectives 
counsel in favor of extending preferential treatment to universities, 
for example, by providing a more robust experimental use exemption 
so that noncommercial academic research may proceed relatively 
unimpeded. 
1. Patentability.  As discussed above, academic patentees have 
occasionally argued to relax various requirements of patentability, 
such as the definition of diligence and the written description 
 
 470. And, of course, when policy objectives counsel in favor of academic exceptionalism, 
such exceptionalism may take the form of disparate treatment that either advances or 
contravenes universities’ own articulated preferences. 
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requirement,471 for university inventions. They have sometimes 
supported their arguments by citing the Bayh-Dole Act, which (they 
contend) demonstrates Congress’s endorsement of university 
patenting and technology transfer. For a variety of reasons, however, 
courts and Congress should not relax the requirements of 
patentability for academic inventions. 
First, although selectively relaxing patentability requirements 
would increase academic patenting, there is no evidence that the 
number of patents owned by universities is suboptimal. If anything, 
commentators suggest that universities are obtaining too many 
patents, thus creating potentially deleterious anticommons regimes 
and patent thickets.472 Many university inventions, such as some 
research tools, can achieve widespread dissemination and 
commercialization without patents. Approached from a different 
angle, if universities were particularly good stewards of inventions, 
there might be a plausible policy argument for selectively relaxing 
patentability requirements to increase the number of university 
patents. However, there is little indication that universities are 
particularly effective or enlightened stewards of technology. As seen 
in cases involving human embryonic stem cells, cotransformation, and 
genes related to breast cancer, universities have exhibited many of 
the same rent-seeking, self-interested tendencies as commercial 
entities.473 And in the cases of COX-2 inhibitors and NF-kB, patents 
did not facilitate technology transfer so much as allow universities 
and their licensees to sue manufacturers who were already developing 
useful products.474 
Second, relaxing patentability requirements for universities 
would have deleterious effects on the kind of inventions patented by 
academic institutions. In particular, relaxing patentable subject 
 
 471. See supra notes 325–32, 343–61 and accompanying text. 
 472. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (“[P]rivatization can go 
astray when too many owners hold rights in previous discoveries that constitute obstacles to 
future research.”). 
 473. As noted above, however, universities have sometimes made patented inventions 
widely available to the research community. See supra notes 276–82 and accompanying text. 
Some commercial firms do this as well, however.  
 474. Cf. Nelson, supra note 295, at 16. As these examples demonstrate, the “problem” of 
overreaching in academic patenting may be addressed through restricting general doctrines of 
patentability. However, doctrinal modification represents a rather blunt instrument, and a more 
targeted intervention would involve influencing the particular patenting and licensing decisions 
of individual university patentees. See infra Part V.B.2.  
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matter, utility, enablement, or written description requirements 
would permit more embryonic, upstream technologies to qualify for 
patenting. This would not be a welcome development. To be sure, 
Professor Edmund Kitch’s “prospect theory” famously defends broad 
patents on early stage technological prospects.475 According to this 
view, allowing a single patentee to coordinate technological 
development prevents wasteful races for patents and duplicative 
effort.476 There are indeed conceptual parallels between prospect 
theory and the Bayh-Dole Act, both of which contemplate a single 
entity (for example, a university) managing the development of an 
early stage technology. Commentators, however, have challenged the 
propriety of early, broad patents on technological prospects, 
particularly when rivalry and competition in innovation markets has 
been extremely effective in driving invention and 
commercialization.477 Ultimately, allowing patents on overly 
embryonic inventions would be counterproductive both because of 
the significant effort that would still be required to create commercial 
products and because of the potential for broad patents to stymie 
multiple avenues of technological development.478 
Third, strategic considerations also weigh against relaxing the 
standards of patentability for academic inventions. If universities 
qualified for special treatment, commercial entities could easily game 
this distinction by sponsoring research at universities and then 
exclusively licensing any resulting patented inventions. Such 
gamesmanship would erode whatever social value preferential 
treatment for academic inventions was intended to generate. 
Turning from the rules of patentability to patent fees, the AIA’s 
extension of micro entity status to universities, which qualifies 
academic patentees for lower fees, is also unwarranted. First, as 
noted, there is little empirical evidence suggesting that universities 
are not patenting enough. Second, although university scientists are 
the named inventors on patent applications, they typically do not pay 
 
 475. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
266 (1977). 
 476. Id. 
 477. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 135–41 (2004); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 872–77 (1990).  
 478. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (articulating a concern that a 
patent on a process of producing compounds of no known utility could “block off whole areas of 
scientific development”). 
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patent fees; that responsibility falls to universities (more specifically, 
TTOs), many of which are rather macro, well-heeled institutions. 
Third, many sophisticated TTOs identify a prospective licensee to 
cover patent fees before initiating prosecution. In such cases, 
subsidizing university patent applications might actually chill this 
favorable screening practice. There appears to be little principled 
reason for extending lower fees to academic patentees, which reflects 
blatant legislative rent-seeking on the part of universities.479 
Even though courts and Congress should resist favoring 
universities in the requirements of patentability, general reforms to 
patent law informed by the unique needs of academic research are 
not necessarily problematic. First, the CREATE Act’s extension of 
the § 103(c) safe harbor to joint research agreements480 fosters 
partnerships between university and industrial scientists while helping 
to preserve the patentability of resulting inventions. Although such 
collaborations give rise to concerns over the commercialization of 
academia, they also serve as valuable conduits for transferring 
academic technical knowledge to the private sector (and vice versa).481 
Second, the AIA’s establishment of a first-inventor-to-file-or-disclose 
system rather than a true first-inventor-to-file system represents good 
policy. Maintaining a one-year grace period is particularly congruent 
with academic norms of rapid publication and may decrease the 
chilling effects that patenting would otherwise exert on academic 
discourse. The rub here, however, arises not from academic 
exceptionalism, but from American exceptionalism. The value of the 
United States’s one-year grace period is severely limited to the extent 
that most other jurisdictions maintain systems closer to pure first-
inventor-to-file regimes. Thus, if a university seeks patent rights on a 
technology in multiple jurisdictions (which will be the case for the 
vast majority of technologies of commercial importance), then it must 
abide by the more stringent first-to-file rules of those countries.482 
 
 479. See, e.g., Micro-Entity Status: Can We All Qualify?, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 26, 2012, 
3:31 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/micro-entity-status-can-we-all-qualify.html 
(quoting independent inventor Raoul Drapeau). 
 480. See supra notes 412–20 and accompanying text. 
 481. Lee, supra note 303, at 1549–51. 
 482. An academic inventor who discloses an invention and then files for a patent within one 
year will be able to obtain a patent in the United States because of the one-year grace period. 
However, she will not be able to obtain patent rights in other jurisdictions that follow an 
absolute novelty regime with no grace period. Thus, for all commercially valuable inventions 
with a potential global market, a prudent patentee should not engage in any public disclosure 
prior to filing a patent application. 
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2. Remedies.  With respect to enforcement, an important issue is 
the appropriate remedy that university patentees should obtain upon 
successfully asserting their patents. In eBay, the Supreme Court 
clarified that university patentees should not be categorically 
excluded from obtaining injunctive relief, even though they do not 
manufacture any products.483 In exercising their equitable discretion, 
however, courts should be mindful of the unique role of universities 
as nonprofit, public-interest institutions as well as the individual 
circumstances of technology transfer. In some cases, the absence of 
irreparable harm, adequacy of legal remedies, balance of hardships, 
and public interest may counsel against granting an injunction, and 
ongoing royalties may be sufficient to compensate the university for 
infringement. In particular, for the subset of university inventions that 
arise from federal funding, it would be helpful for courts to consider 
the policy aims of the Bayh-Dole Act in their injunction analyses. 
Given that federal funds have satisfied the incentive to invent such 
technologies, injunctive relief is best justified based on providing 
incentives to develop an invention into a commercial product. Courts 
should consider whether exclusive rights are necessary to serve this 
function when a plaintiff asserts a university patent. In some cases, 
patented university technologies achieve wide commercialization 
despite the patent,484 thus calling into question whether an injunction 
would truly serve the public interest. 
3. Decisions to Obtain and License Patents.  As illustrated in 
various case studies above, problematic instances of academic 
patenting arise not simply from liberal doctrines of patentability, but 
from universities’ specific decisions to patent particular technologies 
(as opposed to leaving them in the public domain) and license them 
restrictively. Notably, although the Bayh-Dole Act allows universities 
to patent federally funded inventions, it does not require them to do 
so; universities maintain significant discretion regarding whether to 
seek exclusive rights and how to assert them. Accordingly, although 
courts and Congress should resist modifying general rules of 
patentability either in favor of or against university inventions, soft 
regulation can bear valuable fruit in shaping individual university 
 
 483. See supra Part III.B.2.e. 
 484. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 
131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). 
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patenting and licensing practices. As demonstrated above, some 
universities have exploited their discretion in publicly spirited ways, 
declining to patent technologies that do not require additional private 
investment for exploitation or licensing patents at lower rates for 
noncommercial versus commercial uses. Government intervention 
can help encourage and expand these practices. Whereas legal 
doctrine and statutory reforms are rather blunt instruments for 
guiding patenting and licensing decisions, funding agencies can utilize 
the power of the purse to influence academic grantees in a more 
targeted, contextually sensitive manner. 
Indeed, agencies like NIH have put strings on government 
money to influence universities’ patenting and licensing practices.485 
For instance, NIH has discouraged grant recipients from patenting 
DNA sequences within the Human Genome Project and has 
encouraged (if not required) grantees to widely license patented 
research tools for academic investigation.486 Furthermore, it has issued 
guidance for licensing research tools and genomic inventions487 and 
offered recommendations regarding corporate sponsors’ control over 
academic scientists.488 Funding agencies, which possess technical 
expertise and do not directly profit from government-financed 
patents, should continue to help shape university patenting and 
licensing practices to serve the public interest. 
Agencies, however, can do more. In particular, NIH has been 
notoriously reluctant to exercise rights under the Bayh-Dole Act to 
enhance access to federally funded inventions.489 These mechanisms—
particularly march-in rights—have great potential to enhance access 
to federally funded inventions for research and healthcare purposes, 
 
 485. Indeed, the Supreme Court has tacitly recognized that funding agencies may influence 
the behavior of grantees. Cf. Roche, 131 S. Ct. at 2199 (“Agencies that grant funds to federal 
contractors typically expect those contractors to obtain assignments [of patents from 
inventors].”). 
 486. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 279, at 928–29; NHGRI Policy Regarding Intellectual Property 
of Human Genome Sequence, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 9, 1996), 
http://www.genome.gov/10000926. 
 487. See Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 
18,413, 18,413–15 (Apr. 11, 2005); Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research 
Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final 
Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1 (Dec. 23, 1999); NIH Policy on Sharing of Model 
Organisms for Biomedical Research, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (May 7, 2004), http://grants.nih.gov/
grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-04-042.html. 
 488. See Cristina Weschler, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University Research 
After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1567 (2004). 
 489. See Lee, supra note 283, at 951–55. 
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but NIH has rarely exploited them. Part of the difficulty lies in the 
Act’s relatively high standards for instituting these mechanisms. In 
this regard, the findings of this Article support the proposal of 
Professors Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg to modify the Bayh-Dole 
Act to allow funding agencies more flexibility to determine whether 
and how universities patent and license federally funded inventions.490 
4. Universities as Infringers.  Turning from universities as 
patentees to potential infringers, this Article identifies one context in 
which social welfare concerns favor academic exceptionalism. In this 
regard, this Article joins others in arguing for an experimental use 
exception to patent infringement for nonprofit university 
researchers.491 Although universities increasingly behave like 
commercial entities, there is still much social value to academic 
research unfettered by patent constraints.492 Even though early fears 
of a tragedy of the anticommons in biomedical research493 have not 
materialized (particularly toward the upstream end of scientific 
research), the potential for exclusive rights to inhibit productive 
activity persists.494 In some ways, an experimental use exception would 
simply safeguard the current state of affairs in which patentees almost 
never sue university researchers for infringement, and university 
 
 490. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 238, at 310–13. The case for discouraging university 
patents on software is particularly strong given the relatively low development costs of such 
inventions. See Rai et al., supra note 254, at 1550. 
 491. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 471–72 (advancing a waiver proposal); Mueller, 
supra note 137, at 54–57 (arguing for a liability-rule model to allow nonconsensual 
“development use” of patented research tools that are not readily available); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 535 
(2008) [hereinafter Strandburg, Users as Innovators] (advocating a “double-edged sword” 
research exception); Strandburg, supra note 137, at 138–44 (proposing a delayed compulsory 
license regime for research tools).  
 492. See Strandburg, Users as Innovators, supra note 491, at 503 (“It is in society’s interest to 
have research performed by the quickest and most effective researchers.”). It should be 
acknowledged that an experimental use exception may also benefit commercial firms, 
particularly if those firms sponsor research at universities with the aim of exploiting the 
exception and then licensing any resulting inventions arising from that research. Although 
policymakers can monitor such situations, they need not be particularly troubling if the “quasi-
commercial” research still has significant academic value and does not significantly erode the 
incentives of patentees. 
 493. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 472, at 698. 
 494. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking 
the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1080–84 (2008) (identifying 
several negative effects on university research). 
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researchers rarely attempt to clear patents.495 Not surprisingly, 
university representatives496 as well as organizations supporting 
academic research, such as the National Research Council,497 have 
called for an experimental use exception. 
A thorny question, however, is the precise mechanism by which 
such an experimental use exception would arise, an issue upon which 
scholars have offered detailed proposals.498 The most promising 
approach would take the form of a statutory amendment to the 
Patent Act. In this regard, it bears mentioning that many other 
countries have formally codified an experimental use exception.499 As 
Professor Katherine Strandburg argues, such a statute should 
distinguish between “experimenting on” and “experimenting with” 
patented technologies;500 the former certainly appears to be well-
qualified for a research exception. Given the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Madey, an ex ante experimental use exception is unlikely 
to arise in doctrine. However, an intermediate, ex post approach may 
emerge from remedies analysis. As I have argued elsewhere, courts 
should utilize eBay’s equitable flexibility to consider denying 
injunctive relief when a university scientist infringes an 
“infrastructural” patent, the exploitation of which promises 
significant social benefits relative to costs.501 Although this approach 
would provide less ex ante certainty to would-be infringers, it may be 
a more palatable intervention for patentees, as it provides 
compensation and thus maintains incentives to invent and 
commercialize. 
CONCLUSION 
Patents and the university, once operating at each other’s 
peripheries, have moved into each other’s cores. This Article has 
traced the twin trends of academic internalization and exceptionalism 
within patent law. Before the late twentieth century, academic science 
 
 495. Cf. Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary 
Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2266 (2009). 
 496. See, e.g., Perspectives on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing, supra 
note 432, at 11 (statement of Charles E. Phelps, Provost, Univ. of Rochester). 
 497. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 434, at 82. 
 498. See supra note 491. 
 499. See Strandburg, supra note 137, at 89 (including Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
Japan). 
 500. Id. at 88–89. 
 501. Lee, supra note 120, at 102–09. 
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was largely peripheral to the patent system. However, as academic 
science has grown more aggressive and as universities have vastly 
increased their patenting activities, academic research and practices 
have frequently become the subject of patent doctrine. Courts, 
responding to normative and behavioral changes on the part of 
universities, now view academic science as fully integrated into the 
commercial narrative of the patent system. The internalization of 
academic science within patent law has reached its zenith in 
legislative patent reform, as the interests of university research are 
now hardwired in statute. 
Along the way, academic exceptionalism has evolved 
considerably. Up until the late twentieth century, patent courts, citing 
traditional academic norms, erected barriers between universities and 
the patent system and occasionally extended differential treatment to 
academic institutions. As universities began to embrace commercial 
norms, practices, and policies, however, contemporary patent courts 
have rejected academic exceptionalism. Whereas academic 
exceptionalism died in the courts, it has been resurrected in statute, as 
universities have wielded their political power to secure preferential 
treatment in recent patent reform legislation. 
Turning from the descriptive to the normative, this Article has 
argued that in certain contexts, university research does indeed 
warrant special treatment in the patent system. Courts have been 
correct to reject universities’ attempts to relax standards of 
patentability, but they should consider the unique circumstances of 
university patenting and technology transfer in determining the 
appropriateness of injunctive relief. Federal funding agencies should 
utilize soft regulation to guide universities’ patenting and licensing 
decisions to serve the public interest. One area in which academic 
exceptionalism is warranted is infringement, where an experimental 
use exception can ensure that valuable scientific research proceeds 
uninhibited by patents. Through combining various hard and soft 
regulatory mechanisms, the patent system can better regulate and 
unleash the enormous innovative potential of the modern research 
university. 
